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Done Nothing Wrong: Fundamental
Justice and the Minimum Content of
Criminal Law
Alan N. Young

I. INTRODUCTION
Otto Von Bismarck, the “Iron Chancellor” of the 19th-century German
state, is credited with making the oft-quoted statement that “there are
two things you don’t want to see being made — sausages and legislation.”
Despite obvious improvements in the electoral and legislative processes
in the past century, the Iron Chancellor’s pithy denigration of lawmaking
is still asserted in modern times. Our contemporary legislative process
aspires to democratic ideals but often breaks down from the pressures of
political compromise and the influence of powerful interest groups.
Some idealists believe that criminal law is built on a “consensus” model
of community support, but there seem to be more people who subscribe
to a “conflict” model in which the enactment of criminal law is often an
unprincipled political response to the needs of the powerful.1
If sausage-making and lawmaking is inherently messy and flawed,
does this by default give the judiciary the authority to counter defects in
the legislative process by invalidating hastily drafted criminal laws which
do not appear to effectively serve the public interest? Does substantive
review of criminal law to ensure compliance with the principles of
fundamental justice under section 7, and compliance with the presumption
of innocence under section 11(d) of the Canadian Charter of Rights
and Freedoms,2 arm the judiciary with justifiable authority to place tangible
limits on the criminal law power of Parliament?


Associate Professor, Osgoode Hall Law School.
For an outline of the various schools of thought currently in vogue in criminological
studies, see F. Schmalleger & R. Volk, Canadian Criminology Today: Theories and Application
(Toronto: Prentice Hall, 2005), at 14-18; G. Vold, B. Thomas & J. Snipes, Theoretical Criminology,
5th ed. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002), at 228-54.
2
Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act (U.K.), 1982, c. 11
[hereinafter “the Charter”].
1
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The conventional wisdom that courts cannot second-guess the policy
choices made by a legislature rings hollow in a day and age when resort
to criminal law as a response to a perceived social problem has become
routine and perfunctory. The sausage-making factory of criminal law
appears boundless and in need of some institutional constraints. Bismarck’s
insult made me wonder whether a court would sit idly by if a ridiculous
criminal law such as prohibiting the possession and sale of sausages
were to be enacted. There is a perceived social problem underlying the
prohibition — obesity and gastro-intestinal disorders are on the rise and
surely a good sausage contributes to the problem. The prohibitory policy
adopted in relation to intoxicant use, despite its obvious failure, shows
that there is some legislative precedent for resorting to criminal law to
punish bad consumption choices. Faced with a law of this nature, would
a court restrict itself to formal questions like “is the definition of sausage
unduly vague?” or “is it a constitutional requirement that the accused know
he/she is selling a sausage?”, or would the court find some mechanism
to invalidate the law on the basis that it is an ineffective and irrational
response to the social and health problems associated with a bad diet?
At a rudimentary level, the legislative and policy decision to
criminalize conduct should be based on three deceptively simple questions:
(1) Is the conduct harmful? (2) Does the nature and magnitude of the
harm warrant the intervention of criminal law? (3) Can the criminal law
effectively combat the harm without undue erosion of liberty and privacy?
There are many different formulations of these questions, and an endless
debate on the proper definition of harm, but, at a minimum, as Paul Roberts
has noted:
. . . the advocate of any particular criminal prohibition needs to supply
a good reason, not just for generalized state interference in the lives of
individuals, but for that special form of state regulation represented by
criminal sanctions: that is, hard treatment (with serious implications for
personal autonomy) administered through procedures specially designed
to communicate the sting of blame or “censure”.3

If a court were to engage in substantive review of the merits of criminal
law then presumably it would be addressing questions of this nature.
Despite the supposed taboo nature of this inquiry, the courts do address
3
Paul Roberts, “Philosophy, Feinberg, Codification, and Consent: A Progress Report on
English Experiences of Criminal Law Reform” (2001) 5 Buff. Crim. L. Rev. 173, at 217, in Vera
Bergelson, “The Right to Be Hurt: Testing the Boundaries of Consent” (2007) 75 Geo. Wash. L.
Rev. 165, at 183.
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these questions under the guise of statutory interpretation, and even modest
interpretation can serve to amend, revise and alter legislative policy
choices.4 However, statutory interpretation leaves the criminal law
somewhat intact whereas constitutional invalidation acts as a complete
denial of legislative policy choices, and for this reason the popular
sentiment is that the courts stray too far into the legislative domain if
they invalidate criminal law solely on the basis of a negative assessment
of the law’s merits.
This paper has two modest objectives. The primary purpose is to
chronicle and assess the operation of the principles of fundamental
justice, and the presumption of innocence, in setting minimum standards
for the enactment of criminal law. To that end, 106 appellate decisions
were reviewed5 to determine if the developing jurisprudence under
section 7 of the Charter has been informed by a clear and coherent
theory of criminal law. The secondary purpose to is provide a practical
justification for expanding substantive review to include a more vigorous
assessment of the merits of the criminal law. The debate over the scope
of substantive review is thorny and this paper will not wade too deeply
into the debate. The support for substantive review presented in this paper
arises primarily from the belief that the legislative process with respect
to criminal law is uniquely flawed. Professor William Stuntz’s provocative
and persuasive article, “The Pathological Politics of Criminal Law”, 6
provides a comprehensive analysis of the unique flaws, and much of the
inspiration for my assertion of expanded substantive review is drawn from
his work. A snapshot of his analysis is contained in the following passage:
One of the bedrock principles of criminal law is that legislatures, not
courts, should be the primary definers of crime. The usual reason given
is that judicial crime creation carries too big a risk of non-majoritarian
crimes, which in turn creates too much of a risk that ordinary people
won’t know what behavior can get them into trouble. The image is of
4
Two dramatic examples in which statutory interpretation has resulted in a significant
alteration of the elements of the crime are: R. v. Sharpe, [2001] S.C.J. No. 3, 150 C.C.C. (3d) 321
(S.C.C.) (child pornography) and Canadian Foundation for Children, Youth and the Law v. Canada
(Attorney General), [2004] S.C.J. No. 6, 180 C.C.C. (3d) 353 (S.C.C.) (correction of child by force).
5
I reviewed 106 appellate decisions in seven categories (mens rea, presumption of
innocence, harm principle, consent, arbitrariness (overbreadth), vagueness and defences). In addition
to Supreme Court of Canada cases, I reviewed appellate decisions if they have not been overtaken
by a Supreme Court decision (e.g., from 1982-85 there were numerous appellate decisions on the
reverse onus for the offence of possession for the purpose — as the Supreme Court in R. v. Oakes,
[1986] S.C.J. No. 7, [1986] 1 S.C.R. 103 (S.C.C.) dealt with this issue, these appellate decisions
were not included in the survey).
6
W. Stuntz, “The Pathological Politics of Criminal Law” (2001) 100 Mich. L. Rev. 505.
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legislatures that faithfully represent popular norms, and hence accurately
define the universe of serious norm-breakers, while prudish old judges
seek to impose their unrepresentative values on an unfortunate population.
. . . It turns out that both the argument and the image are backward. It is
legislators who are likely to criminalize conduct ordinary people might
innocently engage in — not in order to punish that conduct, but in
order to take symbolic stands or make punishment of other conduct easier.
Court’s lawmaking tendencies are more balanced, less tilted in favor
of broader liability. The places in criminal law where liability has been
expanded are almost all the product of legislation. The few places where
liability has contracted find their source in judicial opinions.7

The establishment by the judiciary of minimum standards for valid
criminal law can only be achieved if supported by a clear and consistent
theoretical vision of the role of criminal law in modern society. Presumably,
the courts would have a better-developed theoretical perspective than
would the average politician, and this expertise provides the courts with
some justification for reviewing the substantive content of criminal law.
In fairness to the courts, it must be recognized that there is no theoretical
consensus on the role of criminal law. Professor George Fletcher has
convincingly argued for a “polycentric” theory of the nature of criminal
law in which no single principle can possibly provide an adequate account
of the content of criminal law.8 Both scholars and lawmakers must
“resist the temptation to reduce the criminal law to a single formula for
determining when conduct ought to be treated as criminal”.9 Criminal
law has not been built on a monolithic theory. In fact, “what counts as
crime at one place and time, culture, or location may not be considered
criminal at another time, in another culture, or even across the street.”10
Despite the protean nature of criminal law and criminal law theory, it is
submitted that the morality of aspiration obligates the judiciary to set limits
to criminalization under the umbrella of the principles of fundamental
justice, and this task is next to impossible without some rudimentary
theoretical framework or orientation.

7
W. Stuntz, “The Pathological Politics of Criminal Law” (2001) 100 Mich. L. Rev. 505,
at 576; for a similar article, see, A.J. Ashworth, “Is the Criminal Law a Lost Cause?” (2000) 116
Law Q. Rev.
8
Douglas Husak, “Crimes Outside the Core” (2004) 39 Tulsa L. Rev. 755, at 757.
9
George Fletcher, Rethinking Criminal Law (Boston: Little, Brown and Co., 1978), at xxii.
10
Mark M. Lanier & Stuart Henry, “Crime in Context: The Scope of the Problem” in Stuart
Henry & Mark M. Lanier, eds., What Is Crime? Controversies over the Nature of Crime and What to
Do about It (Lanham, Maryland: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers Inc., 2001), at 7.
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In the excitement of the early days of the Charter, the Supreme
Court in 1985 appeared to send a signal that substantive review of the
criminal law would be vigorous and exacting. Without qualification, the
Court expressed a broad and general limit on the content of the criminal
law. Justice Lamer (as he then was) stated:
A law that has the potential to convict a person who has not really
done anything wrong offends the principles of fundamental justice
and, if imprisonment is available as a penalty, such a law then violates
a person’s right to liberty under s. 7 of the Charter of Rights and
Freedoms . . . . 11

This statement suggested that the principles of fundamental justice
would not simply engage the issue of a minimum standard of mens rea
or fault. The invocation of the word “wrong” seemed to imply that a court
could strike down an offence that did not contain sufficient elements to
constitute a moral or legal wrong warranting the criminal sanction. To
fuel the fire that judicial review could extend to the review of the
supposed political question of the wrongfulness of the act, Lamer J.
noted that fundamental justice was not restricted to procedural concerns
and natural justice, and that “[t]he task of the Court is not to choose
between substantive content or procedural content per se but to secure
for persons ‘the full benefit of the Charter’s protection’ . . . while avoiding
adjudication of the merits of public policy”.12 A few years later, Lamer J.
dropped the admonishment of avoiding review of merits and simply
stated that “while Parliament retains the power to define the elements of
a crime, the courts now have the jurisdiction and, more important, the
duty, when called upon to do so, to review that definition to ensure that
it is in accordance with the principles of fundamental justice.”13
As might be expected, the Supreme Court’s approach to substantive
review has been fraught with ambiguity. In the same breath, the Court
says that the Charter has not enabled the courts to “decide upon
the appropriateness of policies underlying legislative enactments . . .
however, the courts are empowered, indeed required, to measure the
content of legislation against the guarantees of the Constitution”

11
Reference re Section 94(2) of the Motor Vehicle Act (B.C.), [1985] S.C.J. No. 73, [1985]
2 S.C.R. 486, at 492 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Motor Vehicle Reference”].
12
Reference re Section 94(2) of the Motor Vehicle Act (B.C.), [1985] S.C.J. No. 73, [1985]
2 S.C.R. 486, at 499 (S.C.C.).
13
R. v. Vaillancourt, [1987] S.C.J. No. 83, [1987] 2 S.C.R. 636, at 652 (S.C.C.).
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(emphasis added).14 In light of the mixed messages emanating from the
Court on the limits of substantive review, this paper will not attempt to
define the nature, scope and history of the concept of substantive review, but
rather will simply attempt to ascertain whether the judicial implementation
of section 7 has explicitly or implicitly set definable limits on the content
of a valid criminal enactment. In Part I of the paper, I explore the openended structure of the terms and conditions of section 7 to demonstrate
that there are no obvious impediments or obstacles in the provision, or
the emerging jurisprudence, to prevent the construction and development
of minimum standards for the enactment of constitutionally valid criminal
law. In this Part, I will also provide a practical justification for wideranging substantive review. In Part II of the paper, I will outline the nature
and scope of minimum constitutional standards which have emerged in
the past 25 years, and will demonstrate that the courts have not warmly
embraced Lamer J.’s invitation to set minimum standards relating to the
“wrongfulness” of the criminal offence.
In any discussion of limits on criminalization, one should pay homage
to division of powers cases under the BNA Act15 However, this paper
will not discuss this aspect of limitations primarily because the BNA Act
jurisprudence adds very little to the goal of setting minimum standards.
For the most part, the division of powers requirements for proper exercise
of the criminal law power amount to little more than a formal requirement
of a blanket prohibition accompanied by a punishment. Nonetheless, the
inspiration for this paper can be found in a 1948 division of powers case
in which the Supreme Court invalidated a criminal prohibition on the
sale of margarine on the basis that the scientific evidence supporting the
harms of margarine consumption had been refuted and it appeared that the
prohibition simply served the purpose of protecting the dairy industry.16
If judicial review can lead to invalidation of a law when the passage of
time demonstrates that the law serves no valid purpose, then it stands to
reason that invalidation should be allowed if one can demonstrate that
the law was ill-conceived from its inception.

14
Reference re Section 94(2) of the Motor Vehicle Act (B.C.), [1985] S.C.J. No. 73, [1985]
2 S.C.R. 486, at 496 (S.C.C.).
15
British North America Act, 30 & 31 Vict., c. 3 (now Constitution Act, 1867).
16
Reference re Validity of section 5(a) of the Dairy Industry Act (Canada), [1948] S.C.J.
No. 42, [1949] S.C.R. 1, [1949] 1 D.L.R. 433 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Margarine Reference”].
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II. AN OPEN INVITATION TO SUBSTANTIVE REVIEW
1. Justifying Substantive Review
Judicial review of the constitutionality of legislation has spawned an
endless debate about the justifiability of allowing a non-elected institution,
the judiciary, to oversee the development of public policy. Not only
have concerns been raised about the institutional and political ramifications
of blurring the legislative and judicial branches of government, but many
concerns have been raised about judicial capacity for setting public policy
and implementing rules. The concerns commonly revolve around one or
more of the following assertions:
(1) Courts do not set their decision-making agenda. The issues raised for
their consideration are restricted by the fortuities of litigation. The
litigants are responsible for setting the agenda, and the issues raised
may be distorted by the motives and resources of the litigants.
(2) Adjudication is focused and incremental judges are called upon to
decide legal entitlement by determining which party has a legal right
and which party has a legal duty. This process is distinct from that of
a legislative planner who must ask “what are the alternatives?” The
responsibility to resolve the particular dispute handicaps the court in
gaining a perspective on the broad contextual setting of the issues.
(3) Judges are generalists and they lack sufficient specialized expertise
to master the intricacies of various policy problems.
(4) The fact-finding process of adjudication makes it ill-suited for
ascertaining relevant social facts. The evidentiary rules of admissibility
place artificial constraints on a judge’s ability to receive information
that may be vital for the development of policy yet irrelevant for the
disposition of the particular case.
(5) Courts lack the power to enforce compliance with their decrees. In
addition, the adjudicative process is not equipped for the monitoring
of the policy implications of any decision.17

17
For a fuller discussion of judicial incapacity, see D. Horowitz, Courts and Social Policy
(Washington: Brookings Institution, 1977); M. Cappelletti, “The Law-Making Power of the Judge
and Its Limits: A Comparative Analysis” (1981) 8 Monash U.L. Rev. 15.
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As Professor Hogg has said: “[t]he anti-majoritarian objection to
judicial review and the debate it sparks is primarily an academic one”,18
and it is beyond the scope of this paper to outline and evaluate the various
objections which have been raised in academic circles. In many ways,
the Supreme Court has indicated that it has no interest in engaging the
academic debate which continues to rage on. In the Motor Vehicle
Reference, the Crown argued for a narrow interpretation of the principles of
fundamental justice on the basis that “the judiciary is neither representative
of, nor responsive to the electorate on whose behalf, and under whose
authority policies are selected and given effect in the laws of the land.”19
Justice Lamer (as he then was) quickly dismissed this argument:
This is an argument which was heard countless times prior to the
entrenchment of the Charter but which has in truth, for better or for
worse, been settled by the very coming into force of the Constitution
Act, 1982. It ought not be forgotten that the historic decision to entrench
the Charter in our Constitution was taken not by the courts but by
the elected representatives of the people of Canada. It was those
representatives who extended the scope of constitutional adjudication
and entrusted the courts with this new and onerous responsibility. 20

Like the Supreme Court, this paper will not address the academic
debate, but, instead, will focus on a few practical reasons why judicial
review should extend to a vigorous substantive review of criminal law
even if this requires some judicial assessment of the merits of the law.
First, it should be acknowledged that this form of review is already taking
place whether or not the court explicitly recognizes its intrusion into the
political realm. As Peter Russell has noted:
[Judges] may mask their non-legal ideas or assumptions and make their
opinion appear as if it were a purely legal deduction ... Judges who
conceal their political, social or economic reasoning may be pursuing
a fairly cunning political strategy designed to reduce the political exposure
of their court.21

18
Peter W. Hogg, “Charter Dialogue Revisited — or ‘Much Ado About Metaphors’”
(2007) 45 Osgoode Hall L.J. 1, at 8.
19
Reference re Section 94(2) of the Motor Vehicle Act (B.C.), [1985] S.C.J. No. 73, [1985]
2 S.C.R. 486, at 497 (S.C.C.).
20
Reference re Section 94(2) of the Motor Vehicle Act (B.C.), [1985] S.C.J. No. 73, [1985]
2 S.C.R. 486, at 497 (S.C.C.).
21
P. Russell, “Comment” in A.M. Linden, ed., The Canadian Judiciary (Toronto: Osgoode
Hall Law School, York University, 1976), at 85-86.
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In 2006, a badly divided Supreme Court assessed and reviewed the
merits of public healthcare and concluded that serious deficiencies in the
public system required the constitutional invalidation of a prohibition on
obtaining insurance for private health care.22 The Court recognized that
its review was an intrusion into a purely political consideration, i.e., the
merits of an exclusive and universal healthcare system and the efficient
allocation of resources to administer this system, but this did not stop
the Court. McLachlin C.J.C. noted that “‘it is the high duty of this
Court to insure that the Legislatures do not transgress the limits of their
constitutional mandate’”23 and “[t]he fact that the matter is complex,
contentious or laden with social values does not mean that the courts can
abdicate the responsibility”24 of review. Substantive review is not beyond
the authority of the Court, and “[t]he mere fact that this question may
have policy ramifications does not permit us to avoid answering it.”25
I recognize that an ongoing practice of substantive review in a few
cases does not provide a compelling justification for the practice, but
one may reasonably conclude that if the Supreme Court is willing to review
a purely political question, such as the merits of universal healthcare,
then surely there should be less concern or objection when a court decides
to review the merits of a criminal prohibition. There is no question that a
court has much greater expertise than a legislature when it comes to the
issue of criminal responsibility. Even though criminal lawmaking is
fundamentally different from ascriptions of liability, it is sometimes
forgotten from a historical perspective that the judiciary has exercised
an overt lawmaking power — at common law the courts readily created
crimes in their role as “custos morum [guardians of morality] of all the
King’s subjects”.26
In 1955, the authority of the court to create new common law crimes
was abolished as judge-made crime posed insurmountable problems in
terms of vagueness and retroactivity. In addition, a common law crime
was created without the benefit of input and consultation other than the
parties and the inferences to be drawn from the situation before the court.
22
Chaoulli v. Quebec (Attorney General), [2005] S.C.J. No. 33, 2005 SCC 35 [hereinafter
“Chaoulli”].
23
Chaoulli v. Quebec (Attorney General), [2005] S.C.J. No. 33, 2005 SCC 35, at para. 107
(S.C.C.).
24
Chaoulli v. Quebec (Attorney General), [2005] S.C.J. No. 33, 2005 SCC 35, at para. 107
(S.C.C.).
25
Chaoulli v. Quebec (Attorney General), [2005] S.C.J. No. 33, 2005 SCC 35, at para. 108
(S.C.C.).
26
R. v. Sedley (1663), 1 Sid. 168, 82 E.R. 1036, Curll, v. 17 (1727) 155.
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This can be a dangerous practice as it undercuts the primary distinction
between tort and crime in that a crime is considered a public wrong
“because through [it] the commonwealth and not just a single individual
is exposed to danger”. 27 Danger to the commonwealth can only be
ascertained with the type of consultative process which is part and parcel
of the legislative process. Nonetheless, many of our current offences are
just codifications of judge-made law and the fact that the judiciary had
the power and authority for centuries to create crime defuses some of
the objections relating to substantive review which are based on judicial
incompetency or inexperience.
In theory, legislative power to create crime is institutionally superior
to lawmaking at common law because of the ability of the legislature to
transcend the crisis of one case and through extensive consultation arrive
at a rational and principled decision regarding the fundamental question
of whether certain conduct warrants criminalization. A healthy dose of
skepticism would suggest that on occasion the legislative process will
not be a principled and consultative response to a social problem. The
failure of the legislative branch to live up to its democratic ideals can
manifest itself in a number of different ways:
Aspects of Canadian politics vulnerable to criticism on democratic
grounds are legion, and include the minimal diversity in Parliament
(particularly, the lack of women, Aboriginal peoples, and minorities);
the limited role of backbenchers; the appointment process and powers
of the Senate; unfixed elections and the legitimacy of the plurality
voting system (“first past the post”); hard-line party politics and the
infrequency of free votes in Parliament: infrequent use of referenda;
and the lack of policy expertise in Parliament.28

One need only look to the 1980s reform of our gambling laws to
quickly see how the enactment of criminal law is not always a principled
and rational approach to addressing a social problem.29 The short history
27
Immanuel Kant, The Metaphysical Elements of Justice: Part I of the Metaphysics of Morals,
trans. by John Ladd (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1965), at 35-36, as quoted in Jean Hampton,
“Retribution and the Liberal State” (1994) 5 J. Contemp. Legal Issues 117, at 122.
28
Carissima Mathen, “Dialogue Theory, Judicial Review, and Judicial Supremacy: A Comment
on ‘Charter Dialogue Revisited’” (2007) 45 Osgoode Hall L.J. 125, at 142.
29
See, e.g., J. Osborne & C. Campbell, “Recent Amendments to Canadian Lottery and
Gaming Laws: The Transfer of Power from Federal to Provincial Governments” in C. Campbell &
J. Lowman, eds., Gambling in Canada: Golden Goose or Trojan Horse?: A Report from the First
National Symposium on Lotteries and Gambling, May 1988 (Burnaby, B.C.: School of Criminology,
Simon Fraser University, 1989); P. Monahan & A.G. Goldlist, “Roll Again: New Developments
Concerning Gaming” (1999) 42 Crim. L.Q. 182.
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of casinos and video lottery terminals in Canada is rather disconcerting.
Historically, gambling was considered an immoral activity which warranted
criminalization because for some it could lead to poverty, family
breakdown and the rendering of the subject a ward of the state. In the
early 20th century, small incremental legislative exceptions were developed
primarily relating to lotteries, charitable gaming and horse racing, but a
solid core of criminal offences remained in the Code. In 1985-86, the
federal government was short on cash for the Calgary Winter Olympics
and a deal was struck with the provinces whereby the federal government
would receive $100 million in exchange for an amendment to the Criminal
Code30 giving the provinces exclusive jurisdiction to conduct and manage
a wide range of gambling operations. Now there are over 60 casinos in
Canada and the industry generates billions of dollars for provincial coffers.
For purely economic reasons, gambling was transformed from an immoral
crime to an activity promoted by government officials to increase state
revenues. Without a doubt, this contract to amend the Criminal Code both
metaphorically and literally demonstrates that the enactment of criminal
law is often corrupted by the pursuits of private interests.
If the legislative process is demonstrably flawed with respect to
enactment of a particular criminal law, there seems to be no reason for
deference and timidity when a court is asked to review the contents of this
law. There may be insurmountable evidentiary problems in demonstrating
the existence of a flawed legislative process, but if there is evidence to
show an absence of a reasonable basis for enacting the prohibition then
the judiciary should not be reluctant to enter the legislative domain.
Unfortunately, with respect to criminal law, there will always be a
haunting suspicion that the legislative process may be flawed in light of
the visceral response which often accompanies discussion of wrongdoing.
The highly emotive content of criminal wrongdoing has paved the way for
continuous “domain expansion”31 by the state. As the Law Commission of
Canada has recently noted:
In Canada discussions of crime and what to do about it have
become commonplace. In recent years newspaper articles, communitylevel discussions, and policy making have all acted as venues through
which to express a desire for harsher criminal sanctions — a “lock ‘em
up and throw away the key” approach to crime. “Such ‘lawandorder’
30

R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46.
Joel Best, Random Violence: How We Talk about New Crimes and New Victims
(Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1999), at 61-62.
31
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talk . . . has become a dominant and daily feature of public culture as
we embark on this new millennium. In our latter-day ‘risk society’,
security is purportedly in short supply and menacing outsiders imperil
us from all sides”. . . . As Garland . . . argues, “the background affect
of policy is now more frequently a collective anger and a righteous
demand for retribution rather than a commitment to a just, socially
engineered solution. The emotional temperature of policy-making has
shifted from cool to hot”. 32

Further suspicion is cast upon the integrity of criminal lawmaking
by the abrupt volte-face in North American criminal justice policy in the
past 40 years. Starting with the Wolfendon Report and Hart-Devlin debate
in the late 1950s,33 and continuing in the 1960s with a strong academic
movement to condemn the legislative practice of overcriminalization,34
there was an emerging consensus that criminal law was not an appropriate
and effective public policy response to every social problem. It became
clear in the 1970s that criminal law was a “blunt instrument” 35 to be
used with caution and restraint. In Canada, the notion of criminal law
restraint found expression in the 1969 Ouimet Report. 36 In 1976, the
Law Reform Commission of Canada published Our Criminal Law, and
in 1982 the Government of Canada itself published The Criminal Law in
Canadian Society. Both texts sing the same song:
The basic theme, however, is important, in stressing that the criminal
law ought to be reserved for reacting to conduct that is seriously
harmful. The harm may be caused or threatened to the physical safety
or integrity of individuals, or through interference with their property.
It may be caused or threatened to the collective safety or integrity of
society through the infliction of direct damage or the undermining of
what the Law Reform Commission terms fundamental or essential
values — those values or interests necessary for social life to be
32
Nathalie Des Rosiers & Steven Bittle, “Introduction” in Law Commission of Canada, ed.,
What Is a Crime? Defining Criminal Conduct in Contemporary Society (Vancouver: UBC Press, 2004),
at xi.
33
See Report of the Committee on Homosexual Offences and Prostitution (London:
HMSO, 1957); Lord P. Devlin, The Enforcement of Morals (London: Oxford University Press, 1965);
H.L.A. Hart, Law, Liberty and Morality (London: Oxford University Press, 1963).
34
Sanford H. Kadish, “The Crisis of Overcriminalization” (1967) 374 The Annals of the
American Academy of Political and Social Science 157 and Herbert L. Packer, The Limits of
the Criminal Sanction (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1968).
35
Law Reform Commission of Canada, Our Criminal Law (Ottawa: The Commission, 1976),
at 27.
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Canadian Committee on Corrections, Toward Unity: Criminal Justice and Corrections
(Ottawa: Information Canada, 1969), at 12.
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carried on, or for the maintenance of the kind of society cherished by
Canadians. Since many acts may be “harmful”, and since society has
many other means for controlling or responding to conduct, criminal law
should be used only when the harm caused or threatened is serious,
and when the other, less coercive or less intrusive means do not work
or are inappropriate.37

For many reasons which remain unclear, the tide changed in the 1980s
with a return to knee-jerk criminalization and increased punitiveness. In
2004, the following description of the shift in policy in the United States
and Britain reflects the state of affairs in Canada:
American and British attitudes toward crime are currently undergoing
a profound transformation, the effects of which are manifest in the
insistence of the public on exacting retribution from the criminal, and
on being protected at any cost. These “righteous demands for retribution”,
these requests for absolute security, are matched by a governmental
emphasis on prevention as the new overarching aim of the criminal
justice system, and one that is deemed to justify all manners of
interference with the private lives of offenders.38

In both Canada and the United States “crime and punishment have
become a cultural obsession of modernity”. 39 The integrity of the
lawmaking process has been called into question because “criminal law
has become highly politicized”40 and “the single most visible development
in the substantive criminal law is that the sheer number of criminal
offences has grown exponentially”. 41 The wisdom of restraint has
been forgotten and because “the criminal law has undergone enormous
transformation in the [past] twenty-five years . . . it is important to
appreciate the urgent need for limitations on the scope of the criminal
sanction”.42
A simple explanation for the recent growth in criminal law would be
a consistent and substantial increase in the severity and frequency of crime,
37
Government of Canada, The Criminal Law in Canadian Society (Ottawa: Govt. of Canada,
1982); Law Reform Commission of Canada, Our Criminal Law (Ottawa: The Commision, 1976).
38
Véronique Voruz, “Recent Perspectives on Penal Punitiveness” in Bruce A. Arrigo, ed.,
Psychological Jurisprudence: Critical Explorations in Law, Crime, and Society (Albany: State
University of New York Press, 2004), at 157.
39
L. Snider, “Abusing Corporate Power: The Death of a Concept”, in S. Boyd, D. Chunn &
R. Menzies, eds., [Ab]Using Power: The Canadian Experience (Halifax: Fernwood Publishing, 2001).
40
Douglas A. Berman, “The Model Penal Code Second: Might ‘Film Schools’ Be in Need
of a Remake?” (2003) 1 Ohio St. J. Crim. L. 163, at 164-65.
41
Douglas Husak, “Crimes Outside the Core” (2004) 39 Tulsa L. Rev. 755, at 768.
42
W. Stuntz, “The Pathological Politics of Criminal Law” (2001) 100 Mich. L. Rev. 505, at 767.
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but the fact is that crime rates have been dropping in North America
since the crime explosion from 1962-80 (ironically the time period in
which the notion of criminal law restraint had gained ascendency).43 There
have been no significant crime waves to warrant the sudden return to
overcriminalization, yet there has been a perception that urban society
has been hit by a tidal wave of crime. As has been pointed out by
Professor Joel Best:
. . . criminologists usually doubt claims about crime waves. Crime waves,
they say, are really waves in media attention: they occur because the
media, for whatever reason, fix upon some sort of crime, and publicize it.
Crimes that might ordinarily receive little notice suddenly become the
subject of editorials, feature articles, op-ed pieces, columns, editorial
cartoons, talk-show commentary, and late-show monologues — the
full treatment used to focus attention on social problems. In this view,
crime waves really are just waves of crime news.
Crime waves seem to have been a nineteenth-century invention. For many
reasons — including rising literacy, urbanization, faster communication,
and, especially, improvements in printing technology — it was in the
nineteenth century that newspapers assumed their essential modern form,
emphasizing reports or current — and especially sensational — events.44

If a newspaper could manufacture a crime wave in the 19th century,
the digital revolution of contemporary times can easily create a moral
panic. Moral panics are largely orchestrated by the media’s construction
of crime,45 and the resulting clamour from a frightened public often leads
to a hastily drafted and ill-conceived legislative response. The concept
of moral panic originated among British sociologists of deviance46 and
has in recent years been employed in American academic circles to explain
43
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Books, 2003), at 171-85.
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45
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and Policies, 3d ed. (Belmont, CA: Thomson Wadsworth, 2007); see also R. Cairns Way, “The
Criminalization of Stalking: An Exercise in Media Manipulation and Political Opportunism” (1994)
39 McGill L.J. 379; Sarah Eschholz, “The Media and Fear of Crime: A Survey of the Research”
(1997) 9 U. Fla. J. L. & Pub. Pol’y 37; Daniel Romer, Kathleen Hall Jamieson & Sean Aday,
“Television News and the Cultivation of Fear of Crime” (2003) 53 Journal of Communication 88.
46
S. Cohen, Folk Devils and Moral Panics: The Creation of the Mods and Rockers (New York:
St. Martin’s Press, 1980); S. Hall et al., Policing the Crisis: Mugging, the State, and Law and Order
(London: Macmillan Press, 1978); P. Jenkins, Intimate Enemies: Moral Panic in Contemporary Great
Britain (Hawthorne, NY: Aldine de Gruyter, 1992).
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the creation, or strengthening, of criminal laws relating to stalking, gang
violence, freeway violence and other crimes.47 Moral panic theory has
also been used to explain the origins of Canadian drug policy.48 Even the
RCMP has acknowledged the dangers of media magnification and last
year released a report criticizing the Canadian media for instilling an
unnatural fear of rising crime.49
There is good reason to believe that the recent exponential growth in
criminal law can be explained, in part, by moral panic theory due to
media magnification. As moral panics arise from the rapid spread of
misinformation and hyperbole, they are a dangerous foundation from
which to launch a new criminal justice policy initiative. It has been
argued that recent legislative initiatives in Canada relating to gangs and
terrorists were triggered by moral panics,50 and it is not surprising that
this legislation has been met with a series of constitutional challenges.51
47
On freeway violence, J. Best, “Road Warriors on Hair Trigger Highways: Cultural Resources
and the Media’s Construction of the 1987 Freeway Shootings Problem” (1991) 61 Sociological
Inquiry 327; On stalking, K. Lowney & J. Best, “Stalking Strangers and Lovers: Changing Media
Typifications of a New Crime Problem” in J. Best, ed., Images of Issues: Typifying Contemporary
Social Problems (Hawthorne, NY: Aldine de Gruyter, 1995); On hate crimes, J. Jacobs & J. Henry,
“The Social Construction of a Hate Crime Epidemic” (1996) 86 J. of Crim. Law & Criminology 366;
On gang-related crime, P. Jackson, “Moral Panic and the Response to Gangs in California” in
S. Cummings & D. Monti, Gangs The Origins and Impact of Contemporary Youth Gangs in the
United States (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1993).
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Abuse, 1991) and R. Solomon & M. Green, “The First Century: The History of Non-Medical Opiate
Use and Control Politics in Canada, 1870-1970” in Judith C. Blackwell & Patricia G. Erikson, eds.,
Illicit Drugs in Canada: A Risky Business (Scarborough, ON: Nelson Canada, 1988), at 88-116.
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Chad Skelton, “Crime stories frighten public: RCMP” Vancouver Sun (July 31, 2006),
online: Vancouver Sun <http://www.canada.com/vancouver/vancouversun/news/story.html?id=
7d3587eb-a1dc-46cb-a4c5-8a17664d95e9>.
50
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Order Expediency: Lessons from the Manitoba Warriors Prosecution” (2000) 28 Man. L.J. 89; Don
Stuart, “The Dangers of Quick Fix Legislation in the Criminal Law: The Anti-Terrorism Bill C-36
Should Be Withdrawn” in Ronald J. Daniels, Patrick Macklem & Kent Roach, eds., The Security of
Freedom: Essays on Canada’s Anti-Terrorism Bill (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2001);
Don Stuart, “The Anti-terrorism Bill C-36: An Unnecessary Law and Order Quick Fix that
Permanently Stains the Canadian Criminal Justice System” (2003) 14 N.J.C.L. 153; “Debate
Guillotined” National Post (November 28, 2001) A19; Joe Hueglin, “Rushing Bill C-36 is abuse of
power” Kitchener-Waterloo Record (November 30, 2001) A18; James Travers, “Bill C-36 demands
scrutiny” Kitchener-Waterloo Record (November 22, 2001) A17; Susan Delacourt, “Haste explained”
Leader Post (November 30, 2001) B7; and see also Law Commission of Canada, ed., What Is a
Crime? Defining Criminal Conduct in Contemporary Society (Vancouver: UBC Press, 2004), for a
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Both the anti-biker and anti-terrorism provisions have been challenged
under section 7 on the basis of vagueness and overbreadth — problems
relating to the proper definition of the targeted conduct. In addition, the
ambitious complexity of the new laws has presented serious difficulties
for the successful prosecution of these offences.52 Moral panics often
lead to poorly defined legislative responses in part due to haste and in
part due to hysteria. Similarly, in the past few years in Ontario, there was
growing concern, or panic, over dangers presented by fighting dogs such
as the pit-bull. The legislative response of a ban on breeding was quickly
challenged, with some success, on the basis of vagueness and overbreadth.53
Presumably, most criminal law is enacted after a principled
consideration of the relevant issues, but there is abundant evidence to
suggest that this is not always the case. There is, and should be, a
presumption of regularity with respect to legislative enactments, but I
fail to see any reason why the government cannot be called upon to justify
its policy choice to prohibit and punish when a reasonable basis has been
established to call into question the merits of the law. Presumably, the
government should be in possession of information demonstrating that it
has not merely responded to a moral panic and that it has rationally
responded to a documented social problem of some magnitude.
With the 2006 election of Stephen Harper and the Conservative
Party came many promises of enacting mandatory minimum sentences
for a variety of existing and proposed crimes.54 Minimum sentences had
been used sparingly in Canada (e.g., first degree murder, use of firearm,
repeat impaired driving) and the value of this inflexible sentencing
approach has been criticized, and condemned, by many social scientists

2005 BCSC 1727 (B.C.S.C.), revd by R. v. Terezakis, [2007] B.C.J. No. 1592 (B.C.C.A.); R. v.
Smith, [2006] S.J. No. 184, 2006 SKQB 132 (Sask. Q.B.).
52
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National Post (May 7, 2007) A4; Chris Purdy, “Edmonton’s $36M gang trial implodes” Calgary
Herald (February 28, 2004) A13; Chris Purdy, “Huge gang trials a giant bust: $36M wasted as
prosecutors, police buried by paperwork” Edmonton Journal (February 28, 2004) A1/Front.
53
Cochrane v. Ontario (Attorney General), [2007] O.J. No. 1090 (Ont. S.C.J.).
54
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Leader Post (April 20, 2006) A12; J. Tibbetts, “Tories Deliver on Mandatory Sentences” National Post
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Herald (May 4, 2006) A8.
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for its illusory deterrent effects.55 Critics of the Harper proposals have
claimed that the proposals will cost anywhere from $5 billion to $11.5
billion over the next 10 years.56 In supporting the notion of an expanded
form of substantive review of the merits of criminal law, I am not
suggesting that the courts should be empowered to invalidate legislation
on the basis that it would be difficult or costly to implement. Allocation
of scarce resources is a paradigmatic political question and is well beyond
the expertise of the courts.57
On the other hand, the merits of criminal law often engage questions
which are clearly within the scope of the competence of the courts. In
proposing the wide-ranging use of mandatory minimum sentences, public
officials have made the claim that these sentences will have a significant
deterrent impact on the incidence of crime. A reporter from the Ottawa
Citizen made a request from the office of the Minister of Justice of
Canada for the studies being relied upon to support this claim. The reporter
was provided with five studies and upon a careful review, the reporter
concluded that the studies were “old”, “misleading”, “methodologically
flawed”, “underwhelming” and “proves exactly the opposite”. 58
Admittedly, criminological data can be conflicting and ambiguous, but
when there is evidence that the government is relying upon faulty data
concerning penal policy, there does not seem to be any reason why a
court would not be competent to review this data even if the review
appears to be calling into question the merits of the state policy.
Substantive review of the merits of criminal legislation is generally
frowned upon because it is seen as an invasion of the legislative domain
by non-elected officials who will simply be reviewing the law on the
basis of their personal opinion or perspective on criminal justice. As the
Supreme Court of Canada has recognized: “[t]he principles of fundamental
justice leave a great deal of scope for personal judgment and the Court
must be careful that they do not become principles which are of

55
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fundamental justice in the eye of the beholder only.”59 This is a powerful
claim but it is largely an academic objection with little practical impact.
The unique structure of the Charter of Rights reduces, if not eliminates,
the risk of a judicial autocracy in terms of criminal justice policy.
The notwithstanding clause, “the puzzle at the centre of the Charter”,60
significantly reduces the risk that substantive review could ever defeat the
will of the people as supposedly reflected in the acts of Parliamentarians.
It is thought that the notwithstanding clause cannot be routinely invoked
to maintain Parliamentary supremacy because it would be an act of
political suicide for the political party compelled to invoke the clause. I
think this reservation is vastly overstated in the context of criminal law.
If a court were to conclude that Parliament did not have a reasonable
basis for enacting a criminal law, in all likelihood this finding of arbitrary
and unprincipled lawmaking could be attributed to some form of moral
panic and political posturing. If the political climate is one of moral panic
then an invocation of the notwithstanding clause would not be political
suicide as it would likely be seen as political heroism by the majority of
voters.
A more vigorous form of substantive review of the merits of criminal
legislation is also consistent with the “dialogue” theory of constitutional
adjudication. This theory was originally conceived of by scholars61 but it
has been referred to in at least 10 decisions of the Supreme Court of
Canada.62 The Court has said:
As I view the matter, the Charter has given rise to a more dynamic
interaction among the branches of governance. This interaction has
been aptly described as a “dialogue” by some. . . .
To my mind, a great value of judicial review and this dialogue
among the branches is that each of the branches is made somewhat
accountable to the other. The work of the legislature is reviewed
by the courts and the work of the court in its decisions can be reacted
to by the legislature in the passing of new legislation (or even
overarching laws under s. 33 of the Charter). This dialogue between
59
Rodriguez v. British Columbia (Attorney General), [1993] S.C.J. No. 94, [1993] 3 S.C.R. 519,
at 590 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Rodriguez”].
60
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61
Peter W. Hogg & Alison A. Bushell, “The Charter Dialogue Between Courts and
Legislatures (Or Perhaps the Charter of Rights Isn’t Such a Bad Thing After All)” (1997) 35 Osgoode
Hall L.J. 75.
62
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and accountability of each of the branches have the effect of enhancing
the democratic process, not denying it. 63

(emphasis added)
The notion of a continuing dialogue between court and lawmaker
could include the idea of a lawmaking partnership with ultimate authority
provided to the lawmaker in the event of irreconcilable differences. The
role of the judiciary in this lawmaking partnership would be restricted to
substantive review but this expanded role does not unduly upset the balance
of power and would surely lead to greater political accountability.
The law relating to the defence of extreme intoxication is one example
of both the best and worst of a dialogue among partners. In the Daviault
case,64 the Supreme Court of Canada was asked to revisit the common
law rule which prevented raising intoxication as a defence to general
intent crimes (primarily assault-related crimes). The Court ruled that the
principles of fundamental justice required that all acts be voluntary and
therefore, even for acts of assault, extreme intoxication “akin to automatism
or insanity” must be an available defence. A media outcry ensued in which
headlines read “drunks who rape and go free; top court ruling means law
should be changed”,65 and Parliament swiftly responded by enacting
section 33.1 of the Criminal Code,66 which effectively reversed the decision.
It remains unclear whether this legislative response was enacted in a
moral panic or whether it was a principled decision based upon the
government’s efforts to collect expert evidence to determine if “extreme
intoxication akin to automatism” was a scientifically sound and recognized
phenomenon.67 Nonetheless, the scientific evidence was collected and
Parliament had the final word through legislative enactment. On one hand,
a coherent dialogue and lawmaking partnership was fostered by the Court
in setting a minimum standard for the actus reus and related defences,
and Parliament responding by concluding that this minimum standard
did not apply in these circumstances because automatism due to heavy
drinking was not a recognized pharmacological phenomenon.
63
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On the other hand, the dysfunctional68 nature of the dialogue theory is
represented by Parliament’s cavalier approach to establishing its supremacy.
Presumably, Parliament should have invoked the notwithstanding clause
to overturn a decision based upon constitutional principles, and as a
practical matter, this act of defiance would not be political suicide in the
political climate. In fact, there was another mechanism available to
maintain an open dialogue with the courts when substantive review
interferes with legislative policy. Upon the collection of the relevant
scientific evidence, it would have been open to the Attorney General of
Canada to make a formal reference to the Supreme Court of Canada to
determine whether the enactment of section 33.1 could be upheld as a
reasonable limitation in light of newly acquired evidence to support the
rationality of the legislative policy to deny the defence of intoxication
for crimes against the person. The failure of the government to proceed
in this fashion shows a level of distrust which does not bode well for a
healthy and fruitful dialogue.
Nonetheless, while the metaphoric portrayal of lawmaking as dialogue
is a sensible concept it must be recognized that “[d]ialogue is . . . the
consequence of a decision striking down legislation, not an independent
reason for striking it down.”69 The notion of dialogue, and the existence
of the notwithstanding option, only provides a comfort zone for substantive
review of the content of criminal law, and this form of extended review
must fit within the text of the Charter and its evolving doctrine. The
American-conceived concept of substantive review never fit well within
the text of the Fifth Amendment70 due process clause, but the open-ended
and ambiguous formulation of section 7 of the Charter provides a more
suitable anchor for substantive review.
2. Section 7 — A World of Infinite Possibility
If substantive review can be justified on the basis of legislative
dysfunctionality, the constitutional anchor for this practice clearly resides
in the open-ended generality of section 7. In the American setting,
Sandford Kadish has characterized the Fifth Amendment71 due process
68
See R. v. Hall, [2002] S.C.J. No. 65, 167 C.C.C. (3d) 449, at para. 127 (S.C.C.) for an
example of when “constitutional dialogue can break down”.
69
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clause “in its substantive persona” as a “protean pinch hitter of last resort”,72
and this characterization equally applies to our Fifth Amendment
counterpart. Textual arguments and arguments over the intent of the
drafters could be raised to narrow the scope of fundamental justice, but
these arguments have been largely disregarded by both the Supreme
Court of Canada and academic commentators.73 Much ink has been spilt
to show how the current approach to section 7 has transformed the right
into one of boundless possibility,74 and this paper will not replicate these
useful commentaries. Rather, this part of the paper will simply provide a
brief overview of the way in which section 7 has been transformed into
a “protean pinch hitter”.
The strength and power of section 7 is contingent upon two variables
— the interpretation of the terms, “life, liberty and security”, and the
elucidation of the content of the principles of fundamental justice. The
threshold issue of “life, liberty and security” serves as a gatekeeper to
decide what types of claims of “deprivation” will warrant judicial review,
and to determine if the deprivation is in accordance with the principles
of fundamental justice. The gatekeeper issue is an important component
in the assessment of the impact of section 7, but in a paper of this brevity I
have chosen to focus on the more elusive question of what constitutes a
principle of fundamental justice.
Specifically, this paper concerns the operation of these fundamental
principles in the context of criminal law and as criminal law by definition
will always entail a deprivation of liberty, any criminal provision has to
operate in a manner which is consistent with principles of fundamental
justice. Criminal law attracts constitutional review under section 7 not
only because of its liberty-depriving potential. The Supreme Court has
also ruled that state-imposed psychological stress or trauma occasioned by
invocation of the criminal law will violate the security interest protected
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by section 7.75 However, there has been little reason to evaluate the
constitutionality of criminal law in terms of its impact on security since
the easiest route for fundamental justice review of criminal law lies in
the fact that all crime is potentially punished by imprisonment.
Although the application of section 7 remains unclear when dealing
with imprisonment in default of fine payment,76 it has become clear that
the imposition of a large fine alone does not implicate the liberty or
security interest of the individual.77 Accordingly, it is conceivable that a
court could rectify the problem of an overreaching and weakly justified
criminal law by invalidating the option of imprisonment, thereby removing
both the deprivation of liberty or security, and the corresponding need
for an exacting fundamental justice review. Admittedly, a crime punishable
by fine alone does not address the problem of continuing stigma by virtue
of the criminal record, but it must be recognized that depenalization may
be an appropriate and effective remedy that has yet to be considered even
though its remedial scope does not intrude as significantly into the
legislative realm as offence invalidation.
In fact, in the early part of this decade the Government of Canada
introduced a “decriminalization” measure to address the claim that the
offence of marijuana possession did not warrant imposition of the
criminal law.78 A closer examination of the proposed legislation shows
that it was not a decriminalization measure but a depenalization measure
in which possession would simply attract fines under the Contraventions
Act.79 Although the legislative proposal died on the order paper, it did
represent a halfway house resolution of the problem of overcriminalization.
Legislatures and courts should stop thinking of judicial review of criminal
law as a zero-sum game of validity or invalidity and recognize that a
potential solution to weakly grounded criminal offences is to remove the
ultimate sanction of imprisonment. With this in mind, Parliament could
create new offences without fear of substantive invalidation and the
courts could mitigate the horror of overcriminalization by ensuring that
imprisonment is not imposed on a routine basis for everyone who fits
75
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76
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77
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78
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within this legislative designation of criminality. To date there has been
no recognition by the judiciary of the constitutional possibility of
downscaling Parliament’s choice of punishment for crimes on the margins
of wrongdoing, and all evaluations of sentencing choices have been
conducted as part of the gross disproportionality assessment for cruel
and unusual punishment under section 12 of the Charter.
With every crime currently attracting the possibility of imprisonment,
it is incumbent on the courts to subject every criminal offence to
fundamental justice review. The breadth of the undertaking underscores
how important it is for the courts to articulate legal principles in a coherent,
clear and concise manner if they are to be elevated into principles of
fundamental justice. What has been missing in the first 25 years of the
Charter is a coherent statement of the nature and form of fundamental
principles of justice. The Court is only able to advise us of the following:
. . . the principles of fundamental justice are to be found in the basic
tenets of our legal system. They do not lie in the realm of general public
policy but in the inherent domain of the judiciary as guardians of the
justice system.
.....
Consequently, the principles of fundamental justice are to be
found in the basic tenets and principles, not only of our judicial process,
but also of other components of our legal system.
We should not be surprised that many of the principles of
fundamental justice are procedural in nature. Our common law has
been a law of remedies and procedures. . . . This is not to say,
however, that the principles of fundamental justice are limited solely
to procedural guarantees. Rather, the proper approach to the determination
of the principles of fundamental justice is quite simply one in which
“future growth will be based on historical roots”[.]80

The search for specific principles of fundamental justice which arise
out of the “basic tenets of the legal system” has proved to be a difficult
exercise. It may appear helpful for the Court to remind us that section 7
must be construed having regard to those interests and “against the
applicable principles and policies that have animated legislative and
judicial practice in the field”, 81 yet problems remain in identifying
80
Reference re Section 94(2) of the Motor Vehicle Act (B.C.), [1985] S.C.J. No. 73, [1985]
2 S.C.R. 486, at 503.
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principles which deserve the label of “fundamental”. Seven years after
the Motor Vehicle Reference,82 the Court had another opportunity to
illuminate the principles of fundamental justice. In Rodriguez,83 the Court
addressed the question of whether the criminal prohibition on assisted
suicide violated section 7 because it prevented disabled people from
ending their lives as a release from chronic pain and suffering. The Court
rejected the argument that respect for human dignity is a principle of
fundamental justice on the basis that “dignity” is too vague a prescription
to constitute a principle of fundamental justice. As for the exercise of
discerning these principles, the Court stated:
Discerning the principles of fundamental justice with which
deprivation of life, liberty or security of the person must accord, in
order to withstand constitutional scrutiny, is not an easy task. A mere
common law rule does not suffice to constitute a principle of
fundamental justice, rather, as the term implies, principles upon which
there is some consensus that they are vital or fundamental to our societal
notion of justice are required. Principles of fundamental justice must
not, however, be so broad as to be no more than vague generalizations
about what our society considers to be ethical or moral. They must be
capable of being identified with some precision and applied to situations
in a manner which yields an understandable result. They must also, in
my view, be legal principles.84

Without identifying a specific principle of fundamental justice, the
Court upheld the prohibition on assisted suicide on the basis that the
state had two overriding interests: the existence of a perceived consensus
in favour of an absolute prohibition and the goal of preventing abuse and
exploitation of vulnerable individuals. At the most basic level of analysis,
all that happened in this case was a balancing of Rodriguez’s interest
against the societal interests represented by the law. There did not appear
to be a clearly stated principle of fundamental justice being debated.
Two years later, the Court resolved another difficult and sensitive
rights claim with a similar balancing act. In B. (R.),85 the Court addressed
82
Reference re Section 94(2) of the Motor Vehicle Act (B.C.), [1985] S.C.J. No. 73, [1985]
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the issue of whether it was violative of section 7 for the state to provide
a blood transfusion to a child over the religious objections of parents
who believe that the transfusion of blood is a sacrilege. Although the
Court was badly divided on the threshold issue of “liberty and security”,
a majority of the Court concluded that the legislation providing for the
compelled transfusion was constitutional because the fundamental rights
of the parents were overridden by the state’s right to protect the life and
health of children, and because this objective had been pursued in a
manner consistent with fair process.
In 1993, the Supreme Court of Canada introduced this balancing
approach to section 786 and within two years the Court was saying that
“[f]undamental justice in our Canadian legal tradition . . . is primarily
designed to ensure that a fair balance be struck between the interests of
society and those of its citizens.”87 In fact, numerous pronouncements
from the Court on the meaning of fundamental justice indicate that the
search for specific principles has been overtaken by the allure of balancing:
The principles of fundamental justice are to be found in “the basic
tenets of our legal system” . . . “They do not lie in the realm of general
public policy but in the inherent domain of the judiciary as guardian of
the justice system” . . . The relevant principles of fundamental justice
are determined by a contextual approach that “takes into account the
nature of the decision to be made” . . . The approach is essentially one
of balancing. As we said in Burns, “[i]t is inherent in the . . . balancing
process that the outcome may well vary from case to case depending
on the mix of contextual factors put into the balance.”88

Balancing of state and individual interests under the fundamental
justice review was doomed to failure in light of the fact that this balancing
completely overlapped with the balancing to be done under section 1 of the
Charter once a violation of any Charter right had been demonstrated.89
In 2004, the Supreme Court finally laid to rest the overt public policy
balancing which had left section 7 with an ill-defined and indeterminate
scope of operation. In the Demers case,90 the Supreme Court of Canada
86
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invalidated provisions which effectively prevented an accused who is
permanently unfit to stand trial from ever being absolutely discharged.
The Court concluded that the provisions suffered from constitutional
overbreadth as Parliament did not have the right and authority to
permanently keep a mentally disordered offender within the social control
mechanisms of the criminal process when there was no reasonable
possibility that a trial would ever take place. Beyond overbreadth, it was
argued that, on balance, the individual’s liberty and security interest
outweighed Parliament’s goal of public protection. This balancing act
was rejected by the Court:
In making this argument, the respondent misconceives the role
played by “balancing” in the structure of s. 7 of the Charter. It effectively
argues that it is a principle of fundamental justice that the correct
balance be struck between individual and societal interests. However,
as a majority of this Court made clear in the case of Malmo-Levine . . .
the “balancing of interests” referred to by McLachlin J. in Cunningham
is to be taken into consideration by courts only when they are deriving
or construing the content and scope of the principles of fundamental
justice themselves. It is not in and of itself a freestanding principle of
fundamental justice which must be respected if a deprivation of life,
liberty and security of the person is to be upheld. 91

Both the original and the new formulations of the balancing act are
confusing and incoherent,92 but the new formulation defies application.
It is not at all clear what type of balancing would be undertaken
in “deriving or construing the content and scope of the principles of
fundamental justice themselves”. Qualifying the generality of a fundamental
principle by reference to state interests denudes the principle of its essence
and transforms the principle into a policy. This type of balancing could
easily lead a court to engage in a more vigorous and extensive form of
substantive judicial review, but this form of review would be indeterminate
and would not serve the rule of law. Despite the difficulties in “discerning”
the “basic tenets” which constitute free-standing principles of fundamental
justice, the principled approach to section 7 will ultimately be more
transparent and will facilitate a more meaningful dialogue between
legislature and judiciary.
91
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In order to elevate a principle into a constitutional principle of
fundamental justice, it is necessary that the asserted principle satisfies
three criteria: (1) “It must be a legal principle”; (2) There must be a
“consensus that the . . . principle is ‘vital or fundamental to our societal
notion of justice’”; and (3) It must be “capable of being identified with
some degree of precision”.93 The criteria provide a more transparent
framework of analysis than would state/citizen balancing, but it must
not be thought that the criteria are so exacting that they would prevent
the courts from undertaking vigorous and expansive judicial review.
Nonetheless, the Supreme Court of Canada does not seem prepared to
use “basic tenets” review to increase the scope of substantive review. In
2003, the Court concluded that the “harm principle” was not a principle of
fundamental justice because it was not a legal principle and it could not
be defined with precision.94 As a result, Parliament is not constitutionally
required to ensure that all criminal offences being enacted are based
upon conduct harmful to others or to society at large. In 2004, the Court
concluded that the “best interests of the child” was a legal principle but
that it was not supported by the type of societal consensus needed to
elevate a principle to one of fundamental justice.95 As a result, the Court
upheld the defence of reasonable use of corrective force as a legal
justification for the parental punishment of spanking.
One can immediately discern confusion and inconsistency. How can
one distinguish between a legal and political principle? The “best
interests of the child” has found expression in family law legislation and
international conventions, while the “harm principle” has an impressive
historical pedigree and has found expression in Blackstone, Beccaria,
Bentham, Canadian government publications and statements of official
policy.96 What informed the Court’s conclusion that the “best interests of
the child” has not achieved societal consensus? This seems counterintuitive. The Court’s suggestion that no consensus exists because our
system will incarcerate parents to the detriment of their children is of no
moment because qualifications or exceptions to a principle do not undercut
93
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the consensus underlying the principle. Qualifications will always exist
as principles are stated at the highest level of generality.
Whether a court is searching for “basic tenets”, or is balancing state
versus individual interest, there is no escaping the fact that this is an overtly
political exercise which will invariably intrude upon policy choices made
by elected officials. A court may take a constrained or narrow view of
the basic tenets and avoid the inevitability of substantive review, but the
opportunity is always present. There is no escaping the fact that the
principles of fundamental justice truly “reside in the eye of the beholder”
and thus the only question is when will the judge as beholder feel
compelled to impose his or her vision on the legislative will of Parliament?
It appears that the mechanism for triggering judicial interest in
substantive review lies in the characterization of the section 7 liberty
interest as one which involves a “fundamental personal decision”. The
primacy of fundamental personal decisions crystallized in the overlooked
decision of the Court in Godbout97 in 1997. The Court confronted a
fundamental justice claim in a non-criminal context. As a condition of
employment for a municipality, the employee was required to reside
within its boundaries. The Court invalidated the regulation on the basis
that it unjustifiably interfered with the “irreducible sphere of personal
autonomy wherein individuals may make inherently private choices free
from state interference”. 98 Prior to Godbout, the Court had already
identified that “liberty” under section 7 extends beyond physical restrictions
on freedom to encompass matters which are “inherently personal such
that, by their very nature, they implicate basic choices going to the core
of what it means to enjoy individual dignity and independence”.99 The
Court concluded that,
if deprivations of the rights to life, liberty and security of the person
are to survive Charter scrutiny, they must be “fundamentally just” not
only in terms of the process by which they are carried out but also in
terms of the ends they seek to achieve, as measured against basic tenets
of both our judicial system and our legal system more generally. 100
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Freedom to choose one’s place of residency could be “subordinated to
substantial and compelling collective interests”101 but, in this case, the
Court rejected a number of different state-sponsored justifications for the
residency restriction.
Godbout suggests that the Court will undertake exacting constitutional
scrutiny when the law interferes with the right to decisions of “fundamental
personal importance”, and the Court has been confronted with many
cases which engage personal decisions of this nature. For example, in
Morgentaler,102 the Court was faced with the right of a woman to decide
what would be best for her and her unborn child. In B. (R.), 103 the Court
was faced with the right of parents to choose a medical intervention
which was consistent with their religious beliefs, and in Rodriguez104 the
issue concerned the right of a disabled person to end her life just as
a non-disabled person can do so. While all of these cases engaged
fundamental, personal decision, invalidation only took place in the
Morgentaler case, and this invalidation was based primarily on procedural
concerns and not upon any substantive principle of justice. In the other
two cases, the Court balanced competing interests and found a state interest
to override the decision of “fundamental personal importance”.
It is obvious that the Charter will be trivialized if its guarantees
apply to personal decisions which are picayune and petty; however,
creating the category of “fundamental personal decision” does not really
help in the analysis. First, dividing personal decisions into fundamental
and non-fundamental is a value-laden exercise beyond the purview of
judicial understanding. Second, designating a decision as fundamental
does not assist because the Court does not provide any specific or unique
methodology for analyzing the constitutionality of state interference with
this type of fundamental decision. The B. (R.)105 and Rodriguez106 cases
both show that the designation of a decision as fundamental does not
necessarily lead to the conclusion that state interference is unconstitutional.
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Nonetheless, it is not surprising that the two strongest examples of
vigorous substantive review, Morgentaler107 and Chaoulli,108 both involve
fundamental personal decisions about choice of medical treatment.
Almost everyone will need medical intervention at some point in their
lives and it did not require a great leap of faith or rationality for the
Court to embrace the idea that choice of treatment is a fundamental
decision which cannot be overridden in the absence of “substantial and
compelling collective interests”. Thus, outside of a few core values which
have received universal recognition, such as choosing the path of one’s
course of medical treatment, it is still a highly subjective exercise to
characterize decisions being made at the periphery as being fundamental
or trivial.
The Supreme Court of Canada characterized the decision to smoke
marijuana for recreational purposes as a “lifestyle [choice]”109 but when
the substance is used for medicinal purposes, the decision is elevated to
a fundamental choice going to the “core” of dignity and independence.110
In fact, the Ontario Court of Appeal ruled that Parliament would lose the
constitutional authority to criminalize the use of marijuana, unless it
constructed a meaningful and effective regime for exempting medical
users from the reach of the criminal law.111 Not only did protection of a
fundamental personal decision require Parliament to change its drug
policy and enact exceptions to its blanket prohibition, but the courts
have continued to assess and review the merits of the government’s
medical marijuana program to ensure that its operation is effective and
does not arbitrarily restrict a patient’s right to choose as a treatment
option an illicit and unapproved medicine.112
Once the liberty interest is characterized as involving a fundamental
personal decision, it appears that the courts will routinely intrude upon
the legislative and policy domains. In this context, the “protean pinch
hitter” that is section 7 of the Charter does appear boundless. For example,
in the medical marijuana context, the government was first compelled to
107
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enact an entirely new regulatory regime, and upon further judicial review,
it was compelled to find a legal source of marijuana for the hundreds of
people who had enrolled in the program.113 Consequently the government
spent millions to contract for a supply of marijuana currently being
grown in an underground mineshaft in Flin Flon, Manitoba. 114 It is
interesting to note that while the Charter does not contain a free-standing
right to health care, as is found in the Italian, Venezuelan and South African
Constitutions,115 substantive review under section 7 has compelled the
government to grow marijuana for medicine and to facilitate access to
private health care. There is no question that a court can, and will, review
the merits of public policy, but it remains unclear when a court will feel
compelled to do so. The question now to be addressed is to what extent
have the courts used substantive review to constrain criminal justice policy
within a set of constitutional minimum standards for the enactment of valid
criminal law?

III. THE CURRENT LANDSCAPE AND BEYOND
1. Constitutional Limits on the Content of Criminal Law
Constitutional norms are always expressed at a high level of generality
and it is incumbent upon the courts to articulate operational principles to
guide decision-makers who implement the constitutional norms in concrete
settings. Operational principles are also formulated at a high level of
generality and at times they have little substantive content, and primarily
serve to express a sentiment or aspiration. The principle of fundamental
justice is one of those empty, but powerful, principles, and with no
substantive content to guide the courts, most of the work done in the
past 25 years with respect to fundamental justice and criminal law has
just replicated, and at times strengthened, the basic principles of liability
which the courts had been developing at common law.
113
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Since the grand opening of substantive review in 1985, there have
been two types of constitutional claims brought to challenge the content
of criminal law. The first relates to rule of law principles which set
certain formal requirements for the legislative description or definition
of the offence. The second set of claims relate to liability principles which
set minimum standards for the degree of fault needed to accompany the
wrongdoing. Over the course of 25 years and dozens of appellate decisions
reviewing the content of criminal law, there is no question that substantive
review has produced a number of discernible principles which constrain
the reach of criminal law. Most of these principles are stated at such a
high level of generality that they are inherently manipulable. As such, the
boundaries for the proper content of criminal law are constantly shifting
from case to case and it remains unclear whether the constitutionalization
of criminal law has been largely ad hoc or principled.
(a) The Rule of Law and the Actus Reus
Considering that it is referred to in the preamble to the Charter, it is
not surprising that the rule of law has been characterized as a principle of
fundamental justice.116 The rule of law has many different formulations
but it is essentially a safeguard against arbitrary lawmaking. The principle
has little to do with the substantive content of the law and a lot to do
with the formal content. The principle demands that laws be clear and
accessible so that law can serve its primary purpose of providing
behavioural guidance. As Joseph Raz has noted, the rule of law does not
dictate whether a law will be good or bad, but rather has instrumental
value to ensure that the law is effective:
. . . the rule of law is not merely a moral virtue — it is a necessary
condition for the law to be serving directly any good purpose at all. Of
course, conformity to the rule of law also enables the law to serve bad
purposes. That does not mean that it is not a virtue, just as the fact that
a sharp knife can be used to harm does not show that being sharp is
not a good-making characteristic of knives. At most it shows that from
the point of view of the present consideration it is not a moral good.
Being sharp is an inherent good-making characteristic of knives. A good
knife, is among other things, a sharp knife. Similarly, conformity to the
rule of law is an inherent value of laws, indeed it is their most important
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inherent value. It is the essence of law to guide behaviour through rules
and courts in charge of their application.117

The characteristics for enacting “sharp” laws which respect the rule
of law have been defined in many different ways. Raz includes eight
principles to define the characteristics:
1) All laws should be prospective, open and clear; 2) Laws should be
relatively stable; 3) The making of particular laws (particular legal orders)
should be guided by open, stable, clear and general rules; 4) The
independence of the judiciary must be respected; 5) The principles of
natural justice must be observed; 6) The Courts should have review
powers over the implementation of the other principles; 7) The Courts
should be easily accessible; 8) The discretion of the crime-preventing
agencies should not be allowed to pervert the law. 118

In a similarly ambitious formulation of the demands of the rule of
law, Lon Fuller sketches the contours of the principle in his narrative of
eight reasons why the lawmaking endeavours of his fictional ruler, Rex,
were destined to fail:
1) A failure to achieve rules at all, so that every issue must be decided
on an ad hoc basis; 2) a failure to publicize, or at least to make
available to the affected party, the rules he is expected to observe;
3) the abuse of retroactive legislation, which not only cannot itself
guide action, but undercuts the integrity of rules prospective in effect,
since it puts them under the threat of retrospective change; 4) a failure
to make rules understandable; 5) the enactment of contradictory rules
or 6) rules that require conduct beyond the powers of the affected
parties; 7) introducing such frequent changes in the rules that the subject
cannot orient his action by them; and finally, 8) a failure of congruence
between the rules as announced and their actual administration. 119

Canadian courts have not adopted all of these wide-ranging
descriptions of the operation of the rule of law. Some of the principles
articulated by Raz and Fuller find expression in section 7 fundamental
justice, while some find expression in common law principles of liability
and others are simply not part of our constitutional landscape. Our current
legal landscape is dominated by one primary rule of law concern: that
117
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laws clearly describe the prohibited zone of wrongdoing. To that end,
our courts have focused on the vagueness of the offence definition, and
overbreadth of the law’s reach — these two related concerns form the
basis of the minimum standard for the formal content of law demanded
by principles of fundamental justice.
The claim that a law is unconstitutionally vague requires a showing
that the impugned law “permits a ‘standardless sweep’ allowing law
enforcement officials to pursue their personal predilections”.120 Beyond
ensuring “that the discretion of those entrusted with law enforcement is
limited by clear and explicit legislative standards”, 121 the rule of law
requires the law to have sufficient clarity “in order that persons be given
fair notice of what to avoid”.122 In assessing the vagueness of the law,
courts are not restricted to the “bare words of the statutory provision, but,
rather, to the provision as interpreted and applied in judicial decisions”.123
Despite its widespread application in many cases, the doctrinal
development of the vagueness doctrine completely undercuts its utility
as a meaningful constraint on the content of criminal law. Although the
rationale for the principle focuses on the comprehension and assimilation
of legal rules by citizens and law enforcement officials, the courts
continuously ask the question of whether the courts can give “sensible
meaning”124 to the vague terms of the prohibition. This misplaced focus
on judicial competency and understanding leads to absurd results which
bear no relationship to the ultimate question of whether the law is “sharp”
enough to guide conduct. For example, in 1987, the Ontario Court of
Appeal was presented with a vagueness challenge to the now-repealed
offence of “gross indecency”.125 The Criminal Code126 did not provide
any further definitional guidance and the Court looked to prior judicial
interpretations to determine whether the courts have given the expression
“gross indecency” a sensible meaning. The Court concluded that the
120
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offence was not unconstitutionally vague as the courts had given the
offence sensible meaning with the test of whether the conduct in question
was “a marked departure from decent conduct expected of average
Canadians in the circumstances”.127
Surely, the judicial construction and elaboration of the definition
of gross indecency is meaningless in terms of guiding conduct and
constraining official discretion. It is actually not that different from the
often-condemned form of Nazi legality which prohibited any conduct
“deserving of penalty according to the fundamental conceptions of a
penal law and sound popular feeling”.128 There is little doubt that the
vagueness doctrine sets a minimum standard for valid law, but the standard
is largely symbolic or rhetorical. Vagueness challenges have been one
of the most common section 7 challenges being raised in courts of law,
but in 25 years there has not been a single invalidation of a criminal
offence on the basis of insufficient clarity.129
Despite two bold invalidations by the Court, 130 the overbreadth
doctrine has not fared much better than the vagueness doctrine. As with
vagueness, the courts have had little difficulty outlining the test to be
127
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[1994] S.C.J. No. 101, [1994] 3 S.C.R. 761 (S.C.C.).
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applied to assess whether the breadth of the law extends far beyond the
objectives behind the law:
Overbreadth analysis looks at the means chosen by the state in
relation to its purpose. In considering whether a legislative provision is
over broad, a court must ask the question: are those means necessary
to achieve the State objective? If the State, in pursuing a legitimate
objective, uses means which are broader than is necessary to accomplish
that objective, the principles of fundamental justice will be violated
because the individual’s rights will have been limited for no reason.
The effect of overbreadth is that in some applications the law is arbitrary
or disproportionate.
Reviewing legislation for overbreadth as a principle of fundamental
justice is simply an example of the balancing of the State interest against
that of the individual ...
In analyzing a statutory provision to determine if it is overbroad,
a measure of deference must be paid to the means selected by the
legislature. While the courts have a constitutional duty to ensure that
legislation conforms with the Charter, legislatures must have the power
to make policy choices. A court should not interfere with legislation
merely because a judge might have chosen a different means of
accomplishing the objective if he or she had been the legislator.131

Overbreadth essentially requires the court to determine if the
lawmakers have “overshot the mark” 132 in formulating the terms and
conditions of a criminal offence.
There is significant overlap between vagueness and overbreadth,
and these two principles only permit indirect review of the merits of law
as they are predicated on only reviewing the means chosen to achieve
legislative ends. The ends or objectives of legislation are not questioned
as part of this review process. Yet it is reasonable to assume that if
Parliament has confusion over the objectives being sought there is a
good chance that some of this confusion will carry over to the drafting
of an ill-defined and general law.
Overbreadth has enormous potential to act as a brake on hastily
conceived criminal law. This potential has yet to be realized but the
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Demers133 and Chaoulli134 cases may signal that overbreadth will be
strengthened and nourished as the courts continue to develop their
conception of an “arbitrary law”. Vagueness and overbreadth are just
specific manifestations of the larger constitutional vice of “arbitrariness”,
and there is some indication that the courts are willing to undertake a
more exacting assessment of whether a law is arbitrary. In its original
formulation in Rodriguez,135 the test for arbitrariness was as follows:
Where the deprivation of the right in question does little or nothing
to enhance the state’s interest (whatever it may be), it seems to me that
a breach of fundamental justice will be made out, as the individual’s
rights will have been deprived for no valid purpose. 136

On its face, this test allows a court to invalidate a law which is
ineffective in achieving its stated purpose, but the Supreme Court
has never explicitly suggested that this is the type of substantive review
contemplated by the rule of law. In Rodriguez,137 the Court did not find
the prohibition on assisted suicide to be unconstitutional and until the
Demers138 and Chaoulli139 cases were decided, the arbitrariness doctrine
seemed moribund.
Although the court was badly divided in Chaoulli140 on the ultimate
assessment of the arbitrariness of prohibiting private health care insurance,
three members of the court were fairly clear in articulating the test for an
arbitrary law and the need to review and assess the government’s policy
choices:
It is a well-recognized principle of fundamental justice that laws
should not be arbitrary. . . . The state is not entitled to arbitrarily limit
its citizens’ right to life, liberty and security of the person.
A law is arbitrary where “it bears no relation to, or is inconsistent
with, the objective that lies behind [it]”. To determine whether this is

133
134
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the case, it is necessary to consider the state interest and societal
concerns that the provision is meant to reflect. . . .
.....
The government argues that the interference with security of the
person caused by denying people the right to purchase private health
insurance is necessary to providing effective health care under the
public health system.
.....
When we look to the evidence rather than to assumptions, the
connection between prohibiting private insurance and maintaining
quality public health care vanishes. . . . The government contends
that this is necessary in order to preserve the public health system. The
evidence, however, belies that contention.141

As has been mentioned, the vigorous substantive review undertaken
in Chaoulli142 may be an exception to the more common practice of
limited review in light of the medical urgency and necessity underlying
the case. It may also be a signal for a willingness to undertake a more
exacting review for arbitrariness. Just three years earlier, the Supreme
Court showed a willingness to expand the arbitrariness review by
constructing a “gross disproportionality” test for arbitrariness which
requires a court to assess and balance the benefits and objectives of the
law against the harms the law may cause in its implementation.143 A law
will be arbitrary “if the use of the criminal law were shown . . . to be grossly
disproportionate in its effects on accused persons, when considered in
light of the [state] objective . . . the prohibition would be contrary to
fundamental justice . . .”.144 It is somewhat unclear if this test was
intended to supplement or replace the Rodriguez145 test for arbitrariness,
but in light of the Supreme Court reliance upon the Rodriguez test in
Chaoulli, it is most likely that the gross disproportionality test is designed
to supplement the traditional test. In this way, it expands upon the scope
of substantive review by allowing the Court not only to assess the
141

Chaoulli v. Quebec (Attorney General), [2005] S.C.J. No. 33, 2005 SCC 35, at paras.
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(S.C.C.).
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effectiveness of the means chosen to achieve a policy objective, but also
to assess whether or not the objective was outweighed by any harmful
side-effects created by the enactment of the law. This balancing is not a
far cry from an outright assessment of merits of the law on a strictly
utilitarian premise.
The review for arbitrariness and overbreadth may present an open
invitation for substantive review when the Court is so inclined. Professor
Hogg has noted that overbreadth:
. . . raises some practical and theoretical difficulties, and confers an
exceedingly discretionary power of review on the Court. The doctrine
requires that the terms of a law be no broader than is necessary to
accomplish the purpose of the law. But the purpose of the law is a judicial
construct, which can be defined widely or narrowly as the reviewing
court sees fit. In [Heywood146] for example, Cory J. who wrote for the
majority, defined the purpose of the law as being for the protection of
children, while Gonthier J., who wrote for the dissenting minority,
defined the purpose of the law as being for the protection of adults as
well as children . . . Even if agreement could be reached on the
purpose of the law, the question of whether the terms of the law are no
broader than is needed to carry out the purpose raises a host of
interpretive, policy and empirical questions . . . It must be recognized
. . . that a judge who disapproves of a law will always be able to find
that it is overbroad.147

The enormous potential for substantive review is heightened by the
approved methodology of using “reasonable hypotheticals” in assessing
whether a provision is arbitrary or overly broad. The Supreme Court
has constantly insisted that constitutional issues not be argued in an
“evidentiary vacuum” and that the challenge be fully animated by the
relevant adjudicative and legislative facts. 148 However, the Court has
also permitted challenges to laws to proceed on the basis of speculation
and hypothesis relating to how the law could violate Charter rights so
long as the hypotheticals are not “far-fetched”, “remote” or “marginally
imaginable”.149 The reasonable hypothetical methodology was first used
146
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in demonstrating that a mandatory minimum sentence could constitute a
cruel and unusual punishment as applied to a hypothetical accused.150 It
has since been applied to other section 7 claims relating to full answer
and defence and overbreadth (but not to vagueness challenges).151
There is little doubt that this methodology facilitates substantive
review as it obviates the need for a person charged with a crime to show
that the law applies in an arbitrary manner to his or her situation. It is
sufficient to show that the law could apply to a hypothetical offender in
a realistic situation even though there is no empirical data or other evidence
to show that this situation ever has, or will ever, occur. In criticizing the
Supreme Court for using reasonable hypotheticals in the assessment of
an overbreadth claim, Professor Hogg has noted:
. . . the majority’s analysis is based entirely on hypothetical cases
involving the most innocent possible offenders. This mode of reasoning
is a very powerful tool of judicial review, since there must be few laws
indeed in which it would not be possible to design a hypothetical case
(disregarding the realities of the police and prosecutorial discretion)
that is caught by the law although it falls outside the apparent purpose
of the law.152

In conclusion, rule of law principles exert an enormous gravitational
pull on the construction and formulation of the actus reus. The rule of
law requires clarity of expression and a rational connection between the
objective and the means chosen to achieve the objective. A court can
invalidate a law which overshoots the mark, but it does not appear that it
can invalidate a law that misses the mark entirely. In the next section, I
will return to the issue of an outright challenge to the asserted wrongfulness
of the actus reus, as it is this type of challenge which directly and bluntly
engages review of merits, but in completing the outline of the current
landscape, I must first discuss the constitutional minimum standards
which govern the principles of fault or criminal liability.
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(b) The Constitutionalization of Mens Rea
As with the rule of law, there are many different formulations of the
principles governing criminal liability. In the early 17th century, Lord Coke
formulated the famous maxim: “Actus not facit reus nisi mens sit rea”153
(the act is not criminal unless the mind is criminal), and for centuries
theorists and jurists have struggled with defining the requisite level of
fault needed to make the commission of wrongdoing a blameworthy act.
The Motor Vehicle Reference154 constitutionalized the principle with its
admonishment that imprisonment cannot be imposed in the absence of
fault, but fault is an amorphous concept and the Motor Vehicle principle
provides little guidance in terms of establishing minimum standards for
imposing criminal liability.
Professor Fletcher sees the evolution of the Coke maxim as manifesting
itself in the following principles of liability:
1.

Every criminal offence presupposes a voluntary human act.

2.

Every criminal offence includes a dimension of wrongdoing.

3.

Claims of justification negate wrongdoing.

4.

Every punishable act presupposes blameworthy commission of the
elements of the offence.

5.

Blameworthy commission requires at least negligent conduct with
respect to every element of the offence.

6.

Intentional, knowing, and reckless actions are worse than negligent
conduct with respect to the elements of the offence.

7.

Excused conduct is not blameworthy.

8.

Reasonable mistakes are not blameworthy.

9.

Subjective perceptions alone cannot justify conduct.

10. Self-defence is available only against unjustified attacks.155

Similarly, in the 2007 edition of Principles of Criminal Law, Colvin
and Anand extract 16 principles which have emerged under the Charter
153
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in relation to criminal culpability, including “the fault principle, the
fair warning principle, the contemporaneity principle, the voluntariness
principle, the cognitive capacity principle, the moral voluntariness principle,
and the symmetry principle”. 156 Some of the principles formulated
by Fletcher and Colvin/Anand find expression in common law and
constitutional principles while others are more honoured in the breach.
In actuality, the courts have been fairly modest and circumspect in
articulating the principles of fault demanded by the Constitution.
In retrospect, the Motor Vehicle Reference157 did not effect a significant
change in the legal landscape. First, substantive review of the principles
of liability concerned issues which historically have been within the
expertise of the judiciary. Mens rea, actus reus, excuses and justifications
have all been developed primarily within the context of court decisions.
Parliament has never provided much guidance with respect to the fault
requirements of a criminal offence, preferring to leave this issue for
judicial development. Consequently, judicial review for a constitutionally
sound minimum level of fault simply echoes the role and function of
common law courts for the past few hundred years. Thus, the Motor
Vehicle Reference did not actually signal the beginning of a rigorous
form of constitutional review which would incidentally trench upon
Parliament’s policy choices — it was just a reflection of the Court already
engaged in a very familiar and comfortable discourse.
Second, the articulation of the principle of the fundamental justice
— no imprisonment without fault — may have been full of sound and fury
signifying nothing. Since the invalidation of the constructive homicide
provisions in the late 1980s,158 the courts have found few occasions to
invalidate offences on the basis that they contain a constitutionally deficient
level of fault. In the constructive homicide cases, the Court incrementally
concluded that the offence of murder must contain an element of subjective
foresight of death, but little guidance is provided as to when subjective
fault will be required for other offences. The Court’s only concrete
stipulation is that a subjective form of mens rea is constitutionally
required only when the offence contains a high degree of stigma and is
subject to a high level of punishment. Accordingly, courts dismissed
156
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virtually every challenge demanding subjective fault as a constitutional
minimum standard on the basis that the penalty and stigma associated
with the crime was not very severe.159 Of course, without a standard for
measuring the severity of sanction this conclusion is meaningless. Within
six years of the constructive murder invalidations, the Court also concluded
that the offence of manslaughter did not have a sufficiently high level
of stigma and punishment to trigger the substantive requirements of
fundamental justice respecting the minimum level of fault.160 If manslaughter
is not a stigmatizing classification with a high penalty (maximum life)
then it is unlikely that any other criminal offence will ever trigger the
constitutional requirement of subjective fault.
So it remains unclear when objective versus subjective liability will
be required, and it also remains unclear whether the “symmetry principle”
demands that there be an element of fault, either objective or subjective,
attaching to every element of the actus reus. In the Creighton161 case, the
Court stated that:
I agree that as a general rule the mens rea of the offence relates to the
consequences prohibited by the offence . . . Yet our criminal law
contains important exceptions to this ideal of perfect symmetry. The
presence of these exceptions suggests that the rule of symmetry is just
that — a rule — to which there are exceptions. If this is so, then the
rule cannot be elevated to the status of a principle of fundamental
justice which must, by definition, have universal application.
It is important to distinguish between criminal law theory, which
seeks the ideal of absolute symmetry between actus reus and mens
rea, and the constitutional requirements of the Charter. 162

Based upon this reasoning, the Supreme Court in Creighton163 was
able to conclude that the mens rea for unlawful act manslaughter only
159
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required objective foreseeability of bodily harm. Objective liability was
justified because “the stigma attached to manslaughter is an appropriate
stigma”,164 and the mens rea did not need to extend to the stipulated
consequence of death because the symmetry principle was not elevated
to a principle of fundamental justice. Ultimately, the underlying thrust
of this judgment is to undercut the creation of minimum standards of
fault and leave the determination to an ad hoc assessment of whether
there exist good policy reasons for departing from common law principles
for assessing fault.
After a flurry of mens rea cases, it is clear that Parliament will never
be able to combine absolute liability with imprisonment in the future,
nor will it be able to create a crime of negligent murder. These were
significant developments in the short history of Charter adjudication in
Canada, but in a practical sense the substantive principle of fault-based
criminality has been restricted to invalidating an archaic relic (constructive
murder) and prohibiting a form of legislation which rarely occurs
(combining absolute liability with imprisonment). Beyond these two clear
developments, the rules and principles governing fault are few in number
and modest in scope.
As a bedrock principle, it has been established as a constitutional
principle that all acts must be voluntary.165 Although technically an actus
reus and not a mens rea principle, regardless of the classification, the
utility of this cornerstone principle as a minimum standard of fault is
somewhat undercut by common law developments in which a skeptical
Supreme Court has reversed the onus of proof for a claim of involuntariness
(“the last refuge of a scoundrel”).166 Beyond the voluntariness principle,
the Supreme Court has expressed support for four basic principles of
fault. This modest expression of principles governing minimum standards
is formulated differently from case to case, but the basic components
find expression in the following statements made by the Court:
1. Punishment and stigma “must be proportionate to the . . .
blameworthiness of the offender”.
2. “[C]riminal liability for a particular result is not justified except where
the actor possesses a culpable mental state in respect of that result.”
163
164
165
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R. v. Creighton, [1993] S.C.J. No. 91, [1993] 3 S.C.R. 3 (S.C.C.).
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3. “Those causing harm intentionally [should] be punished more severely
than those causing harm unintentionally.”
4. “[T]here must be an element of personal fault in regard to a culpable
aspect of the actus reus, but not necessarily in regard to each and
every element of the actus reus.”167
Of course, these principles do not come close to providing guidance
on crucial questions like when is a “culpable mental state in respect of
that result” to be assessed subjectively or objectively, or what are the
criteria to be employed for the classification of an actus reus component
as “culpable”? At the highest level of abstraction, the courts uniformly
pay homage to the constitutional requirement of fault, but at the level of
implementation and application, the rules and principles do not dictate
uniform and consistent results. This has always been the case at common
law with respect to mens rea and it remains true as the interpretation of
mens rea still appears haphazard and unprincipled despite the presence
of section 7 of the Charter. In recent years, the Supreme Court has ruled
that the mens rea for counselling an offence never committed can be
lowered from intent to recklessness,168 and that the mens rea for party
liability can be lowered from purpose to intent (oddly defined as mere
knowledge).169 These cases make little sense in terms of statutory
interpretation and the Court’s act of interpretation seems to bear no
relationship to the modest principles articulated in constitutional cases.
Although there remains some doubt as to the constitutional minimum
standard for actus reus and mens rea elements, if a court concludes that
a certain element is an essential element, then the presumption of innocence
under section 11(d) of the Charter has a role to play in substantive
review. For the most part, the presumption of innocence is used to review
the constitutionality of statutory provisions which impose an evidentiary
or persuasive burden upon the accused. Certain elements of crime,
usually mens rea elements, present practical problems of proof for the
Crown. To ease the evidentiary and persuasive burdens placed on the
Crown, Parliament will often create a statutory presumption allowing a
court to presume that the problematic element has been proved by inference
from another easily proved fact. Unless there is a strong rational connection
167
R. v. Martineau, [1990] S.C.J. No. 84, [1990] 2 S.C.R. 633, at 645 (S.C.C.); R. v. DeSousa,
[1992] S.C.J. No. 77, [1992] 2 S.C.R. 944, at 965 (S.C.C.).
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R. v. Hamilton, [2005] S.C.J. No. 48, 198 C.C.C. (3d) 1 (S.C.C.).
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between the proved fact and the presumed fact, there is a good chance
that the presumption will be invalidated. If, under the operation of the
presumption “it would be possible for a conviction to occur despite the
existence of a reasonable doubt”, 170 then the provision cannot stand.
If all the accused is required to do is cast some doubt on the inference
from proved to presumed fact (an evidentiary burden), then the presumption
will usually be upheld or saved by operation of section 1.171 It is much
more difficult to uphold a persuasive burden under which the accused
must disprove on a balance of probabilities the link between proved and
presumed facts. Persuasive burdens will usually require justification
under section 1.172 The presumption of innocence operates to ensure that
in the ordinary course it will be incumbent upon the Crown to prove all
essential elements beyond a reasonable doubt, and this obligation extends
to essential elements of a defence and not just the actus reus and mens rea
elements.173
The presumption of innocence not only constrains Parliamentary
choices to utilize evidentiary presumptions, but also operates to prevent
Parliament from eliminating an essential element altogether, or substituting
some other element for proof of the essential one. For example, the crime
of constructive murder operated by eliminating the essential element of
foresight of death and replaced this element with four enumerated acts
— i.e., using a firearm, causing harm for facilitating escape, administering
a stupefying thing and stopping breath. The Supreme Court recognized
that section 11(d) of the Charter had a role to play above and beyond the
role played by section 7 in conducting substantive review. Justice Lamer
(as he then was) stated:
Finally, the legislature, rather than simply eliminating any need to
prove the essential element, may substitute proof of a different element.
In my view, this will be constitutionally valid only if upon proof
beyond reasonable doubt of the substituted element it would be
170

R. v. Oakes, [1986] S.C.J. No. 7, [1986] 1 S.C.R. 103, at 132 (S.C.C.).
See, e.g., R. v. Slavens, [1991] B.C.J. No. 692, 64 C.C.C. (3d) 29 (B.C.C.A.); R. v.
Osolin, [1993] S.C.J. No. 135, 86 C.C.C. (3d) 481 (S.C.C.); R. v. Martin, [1992] S.C.J. No. 32, 71
C.C.C. (3d) 572 (S.C.C.); R. v. Downey, [1992] S.C.J. No. 48, [1992] 2 S.C.R. 10 (S.C.C.); R. v.
Gosselin, [1988] O.J. No. 1921, 45 C.C.C. (3d) 568 (Ont. C.A.).
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Keegstra, [1996] S.C.J. No. 21, 105 C.C.C. (3d) 19 (S.C.C.); R. v. Driscoll, [1987] A.J. No. 716,
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unreasonable for the trier of fact not to be satisfied beyond a reasonable
doubt of the existence of the essential element. If the trier of fact may
have a reasonable doubt as to the essential element notwithstanding
proof beyond a reasonable doubt of the substituted element, then the
substitution infringes ss. 7 and 11(d).174

There may be some uncertainty as to whether an element of an
offence is an essential element required by the principles of fundamental
justice, but if the element is deemed essential by virtue of statutory or
constitutional interpretation, then the courts are quite vigilant in ensuring
that Parliament does not eliminate the element through clever drafting and
evidentiary presumptions. The bottom line is that a “statutory presumption
will be valid if the proof of the substituted fact leads inexorably to the
proof of the other”,175 and this principle imposes significant constraints
on Parliament’s ability to tinker with statutory definitions of crime in
order to ease the burden of prosecution.
The extension of the presumption of innocence to safeguard essential
elements of a defence foreshadowed the judicial enterprise of creating
minimum standards for the invocation of exculpatory defences. Fault is
comprised of mens rea and the absence of exculpatory defences, and the
Supreme Court has recognized that the principles of fundamental justice
have relevance for the elucidation of the essential elements of an excuse
or justification. For example, in 1991, the Supreme Court concluded that
the regulatory offence of misleading advertising was a strict liability
offence allowing for a defence of due diligence. 176 However, the
regulatory regime required that the accused make a retraction as a precondition for avoiding conviction. The Court invalidated the obligation
of retracting as it undercut the defence of due diligence. One could have
been duly diligent before the fact of the offence and a retraction after the
fact has nothing to do with conduct leading to the offence.
More significantly, in 2001, the Supreme Court held that “moral
involuntariness” (as opposed to “moral blamelessness”) was a principle
of fundamental justice,177 and with it created a constitutional minimum
standard for all defences in the nature of an excuse. In 1984, the Supreme
Court of Canada characterized the common law defence of necessity as
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R. v. Vaillancourt, [1987] S.C.J. No. 83, [1987] 2 S.C.R. 636, at 656 (S.C.C.).
R. v. Downey, [1992] S.C.J. No. 48, [1992] 2 S.C.R. 10, at 29 (S.C.C.).
R. v. Wholesale Travel Group Inc., [1991] S.C.J. No. 79, 67 C.C.C. (3d) 193 (S.C.C.).
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an excuse based upon moral involuntariness.178 An act will be excused
when it was “realistically unavoidable” because it was “remorselessly
compelled by normal human instincts”.179 In a physical sense, the act is
voluntary but in a moral sense the actor must be excused because in the
circumstances of necessity, or any other disabling circumstance, he or
she was prevented from exercising real choice. In 2001, the Court
elevated this common law principle to a constitutional principle and, as
a result, invalidated the statutory defence of duress because the defence
set preconditions for operation of the defence which bore no rational
relationship with the overriding consideration of assessing moral
involuntariness.180
Finally, the Supreme Court has also strengthened the operation of
statutory defences by requiring that the conditions of the defence are not
arbitrary. In Morgentaler,181 substantive review of the abortion offence
quickly was transformed into procedural review as the Court recognized
that the statutory exemptions for obtaining a lawful abortion were
procedurally flawed. In the course of invalidating the obstacle course
enacted for securing a lawful abortion, the Court held that the exculpatory
conditions of a statutory defence (or exemption) must be conditions which
all accused persons can effectively meet:
One of the basic tenets of our system of criminal justice is that, when
Parliament creates a defence to a criminal charge, the defence should
not be illusory or so difficult to attain as to be practically illusory. The
criminal law is a very special form of governmental regulation, for it
seeks to express our society’s collective disapprobation of certain acts
or omissions. When a defence is provided, especially a specificallytailored defence to a particular charge, it is because the legislator has
determined that the disapprobation of society is not warranted when
the conditions of the defence are met.
.....
Parliament must be given room to design an appropriate administrative
and procedural structure for bringing into operation a particular defence
to criminal liability. But if that structure is so “manifestly unfair, having
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regard to the decisions it is called upon to make, as to violate the
principles of fundamental justice”, that structure must be struck down.182

The “illusory defence” principle will compel a court to review the
effectiveness of a regulatory regime if this regime is designed to exempt
people from the ordinary operation of the law. Perhaps the courts are
not as concerned with assessing the merits and practical efficacy of a
statutory defence because the courts continue to exercise a lawmaking
function under section 8(3) of the Criminal Code183 with respect to the
development of defences. Nonetheless, the type of review contemplated
by the Morgentaler184 illusory defence claim is a significant intrusion into
the legislative domain. The question we now turn to is whether substantive
review can be expanded beyond the invalidation of ineffective defences
to the invalidation of ineffective offences which do not serve the public
interest.
2. The Wrongfulness of the Actus Reus Is a Sacred Cow
The Supreme Court has stated that “[t]he efficacy of a law, or lack
thereof, is not relevant to Parliament’s ability to enact it under the
division of powers analysis.”185 It appears that the ineffectiveness of a
legislative initiative is also not relevant under the Charter analysis;
however, a utilitarian assessment of the effectiveness of a law could be
relevant to the balancing for arbitrariness and gross disproportionality
under section 7 and the balancing of state versus individual interest under
section 1. To date, there has been little discussion of the relevance of
efficacy of law primarily because this is the type of claim which takes
time to present itself ripe for challenge. It may take decades from the
time of enactment to discover through the collection of social science
evidence that the legislation is not effectively serving its objective, and
for this reason it is not surprising that few challenges have been predicated
on an empirical assessment of the operation of the law.
A more fundamental challenge relates to the claim that the law does
not serve a valid purpose from the outset. Unlike an efficacy claim, this
claim does not track future operation of the law but is predicated on the
182
183
184
185
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assertion that Parliament did not have a sound and compelling reason to
designate certain conduct as criminal at the time of enactment. In essence,
the claim is being made to challenge the presumed wrongfulness of the
legislative designation of the actus reus — it is a claim that the actus
reus does not contain sufficient elements to state a “coherent moral
imperative”.186
A claim of this nature was brought in relation to the offence of
possession of marijuana.187 In a nutshell, a voluminous evidentiary record
was compiled to demonstrate that there is no hard evidence to prove that
marijuana use leads to significant harm to the user, to others and to
society at large. It was argued that the “harm principle” is a principle of
fundamental justice and a criminal offence must be invalidated if it is
shown that the impugned conduct does not lead to harm to others
(including societal harm). The Supreme Court rejected this argument
and the reasons for judgment display a confused and incoherent theoretical
vision of the role of criminal law in modern society.
The Supreme Court of Canada’s decision in Caine,188 Clay189 and
Malmo-Levine190 has received extensive academic commentary191 and I
will not spend much time dissecting the case and commentary. The
problem I wish to discuss extends far beyond the question of the proper
political approach to marijuana use, or the relevance and importance of
the rejected “harm principle”. In my view, the marijuana cases clearly
demonstrate that the Supreme Court views the legislative designation of
wrongful conduct to be a sacred cow beyond challenge. Although some
room to challenge is left with the arbitrary and overbreadth claims, this
case simply gives Parliament carte blanche in its criminal law power
with absolutely no recognition that any carte blanche grant of power
will eventually come back to haunt the grantor.
In the context of obscenity and freedom of expression, the Supreme
Court noted that the lawmaker is entitled to enact criminal law if there is
186

George Fletcher, Rethinking Criminal Law (Boston: Little, Brown and Co., 1978), at 566-69.
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a “reasoned apprehension of harm”.192 The standard is low and it is
inconceivable that lawmakers could not show a reasonable apprehension
of harm as the basis for enacting most criminal offences. Technically,
this statement was made in the assessment of whether obscenity
prohibitions were a section 1 reasonable limit on freedom of expression,
and some review of the merits and objectives of the law will be necessary
to determine whether a violation of free expression can be justified. In the
marijuana cases, it was argued that this low threshold test of a reasonable
apprehension of harm should also be employed as a constitutional
barometer of whether the enactment of a law is in accordance with the
principles of fundamental justice.
The lower courts accepted that the “harm principle” was a principle
of fundamental justice,193 but on any formulation of this principle, the
courts concluded that there was sufficient harm associated with the use
of marijuana to satisfy the dictates of the principle. Surprisingly, the
Supreme Court of Canada did not resolve the challenge solely on the basis
that there did exist reasonable evidence of harm, but took the additional
step of rejecting the harm principle for not being a legal principle for
which a societal consensus exists. The Court concluded that Parliament
is not restricted to the enactment of criminal laws which prevent harm to
others, and that the goals and objectives of criminal law are multi-faceted
and diverse. In addition, Parliament need not justify its decision to
criminalize on the basis of any of these diverse objectives. At its essence,
these cases release the state from any meaningful obligation to justify
its criminal law power. While this is consistent with the recognized
proposition that a prosecutor need not justify his or her decision to
prosecute a particular charge,194 when both propositions are combined
you are left with a legislative and executive power which is painfully
unaccountable.
The harm principle was rejected as a principle of fundamental
justice primarily because the Court believed it was not a recognized
legal principle since time immemorial. This cannot mean that a principle
can only be a fundamental one if it is found in judicial decisions of
192
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ancient vintage. Mens rea has become constitutionalized yet as recently
as 1957, the Supreme Court of Canada struggled with the question of
whether the offence of possession of a narcotic required proof that the
accused knew he or she was in possession of a drug.195 Mens rea evolved
slowly over centuries and absolute liability had a role to play for many
centuries.196 In addition, restricting the principles to those expressed in
judicial pronouncements is myopic and inconsistent with the requirement
that the principle be supported by a societal consensus. Judicial decisions
are not a proxy for societal consensus and judicial decisions should be
animated by the entire legal topography, including scholarship, government
reports and empirical studies.
Political theory has a role to play in constitutional adjudication. As
Fletcher has noted, “the political theory we choose will invariably shape
our answers to innumerable questions about what should be punished,
when nominal violations are justified and when wrongdoing should be
excused”.197 It is puzzling that the Supreme Court did not acknowledge
the significance of J.S. Mill, Bentham and Beccaria in assessing whether
the harm principle was fundamental. Ultimately, the political theories
supporting constraints and limits on the enactment of criminal law
became reflected in contemporary scholarship, law commission reports
and government reports.198 This movement from theory to practice
provides the Court with the type of evidence needed to show societal
consensus. Ultimately, the Court ignored the fact that
apart from the libertarians and communists at the extremes, the vast
majority of us are unreflective liberals. We are suspicious of common
law crimes and accept at face value Mill’s principle that the state
should punish only to prevent harm, and we take these two positions to
be an adequate theoretical foundation for our work. 199
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Without engaging the nuances of political theory, it is hard to argue
against the political ascendancy of liberalism, however conceived, in the
modern era. A prominent version of liberal political theory provides
clear support for limiting the state’s power of criminalization:
Liberalism is not one political doctrine but a family of doctrines — a
kind of “faith” with many rival denominations. We can distinguish
two prominent types of liberalism in terms of how they conceive of
liberty: the first conceives of it in Lockean terms, the second conceives
of it in more Rousseauian terms. The Lockeans focus on the danger to
liberty coming from the power of the state, and thus advocate minimal
government and certain liberties (or rights) of subjects (such as habeas
corpus and the right to bail); such Lockeans include Montesquieu,
Constant, Humboldt, and many American revolutionaries. Philosophers
such as J.S. Mill, H.L.A. Hart and Joel Feinberg also work within this
tradition when they insist that a liberal society can, by and large, only
admit laws sanctioned by the “harm principle”, which require that the
state can only interfere with behavior that either harms, or gives offence,
to people other than the person interfered with. 200

I suggest that this notion of liberalism is so deeply rooted we all
assume that lawmakers will only activate the criminal law to prevent
harm to others and society at large, though we often disagree on the
definition of harm and the proof of its existence. Although the Supreme
Court appears to reject this basic component of liberalism by rejecting
the harm principle as a principle of fundamental justice, it then embraces
another component of liberalism by rejecting “legal moralism” as a basis
for enacting criminal law. Joel Feinberg describes this notion as follows:
The liberal does not urge that the legislators of criminal law be
unconcerned with “a man’s morals”. Indeed, everything about a
person that the criminal law should be concerned with is included in
this morals. But not everything in a person’s morals should be the
concern of the law, only his disposition to violate the rights of other
parties. He may be morally blameworthy for his beliefs and desires,
his taboo infractions, his tastes, his harmless exploitations, and other
free-floating evils, but these moral judgments are not the business of
the criminal law.201
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Similarly, the Court notes that “the objective of maintaining
conventional standards of propriety, independently of any harm to society,
is no longer justified in light of the values of individual liberty which
underlie the Charter.”202
It appears that the Court does not have a coherent theoretical vision
of the role of criminal law, but ultimately the Court is a political
institution and an accusation that the Court lacks a coherent philosophical
framework is not that devastating. The accusation becomes more serious
when there is an incoherence between what the Court says and what the
Court does. Concluding that the harm principle is not a legal principle
makes little sense when the harm principle is a fundamental principle of
statutory construction. Under the guise of strict construction, the Supreme
Court has been inspired by the harm principle to effect significant
changes in the scope of criminal offences.203 The Court has said that it
must impose limitations on the reach of the criminal law “in order to
avoid a weakening of the authority of the criminal law by its application
to trifles”.204 In addition, the doctrine of “de minimis”, which is simply a
restatement of the harm principle, has received some recognition by the
Court.205
The most telling example of internal incoherence within the Court’s
theoretical framework is to contrast its rejection of the harm principle as
a legal principle in 2003 with its reconstruction of the concept of
indecency in 2005. In two companion cases, Kouri and Labaye,206 the
Supreme Court was asked to determine whether or not “sex clubs” in
Montreal constituted bawdy houses for the purpose of indecency. Prior
202
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alteration of the elements of the crime on the basis of constitutional principles are: R. v. Sharpe,
[2001] S.C.J. No. 3, 150 C.C.C. (3d) 321 (S.C.C.) (child pornography) and Canadian Foundation
for Children, Youth and the Law v. Canada (Attorney General), [2004] S.C.J. No. 6, 180 C.C.C.
(3d) 353 (S.C.C.) (correction of child by force).
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R. v. Boulanger, [2006] S.C.J. No. 32, 210 C.C.C. (3d) 1 (S.C.C.); Canada Foundation
for Children, Youth and the Law v. Canada (Attorney General), [2004] S.C.J. No. 6, 180 C.C.C.
(3d) 353 (S.C.C.).
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to this sex club case, the Supreme Court had recently grappled with the
concept of indecency in clubs and public spaces on three other occasions,
and the results were not entirely consistent or clear.207 In Kouri and
Labaye, the Court decided to change the rules of engagement and it
rejected the community standards test for indecency it had applied in the
previous cases. The Court formulated a new test inspired and animated
by the harm principle:
The first step is to generically describe the type of harm targeted
by the concept of indecent conduct under the Criminal Code. In Butler
at p. 485 and Little Sisters at para. 59, this was described as “conduct
which society formally recognizes as incompatible with its proper
functioning”.
Two general requirements emerge from this description of the
harm required for criminal indecency. First, the words “formally
recognize” suggest that the harm must be grounded in norms which
our society has recognized in its Constitution or similar fundamental
laws. This means that the inquiry is not based on individual notions of
harm, nor on the teachings of a particular ideology, but on what
society, through its laws and institutions, has recognized as essential to
its proper functioning. Second, the harm must be serious in degree. It
must not only detract from proper societal functioning but must be
incompatible with it.
.....
Three types of harm have thus far emerged from the jurisprudence
as being capable of supporting a finding of indecency: (1) harm to
those whose autonomy and liberty may be restricted by being confronted
with inappropriate conduct; (2) harm to society by predisposing others
to anti-social conduct; and (3) harm to individuals participating in the
conduct.208

(emphasis in original omitted)
The Court imposed a heavy, if not impossible, burden of proof upon
the trial prosecutor. Above and beyond the actus reus elements needed to
prove the crime of keeping a bawdy house, the Crown is now required
to prove the additional element of showing that the activities taking place
in the house were harmful to the participants, other people or society at
207
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(S.C.C.).
208
R. v. Labaye, [2005] S.C.J. No. 83, 203 C.C.C. (3d) 170, at paras. 28-29, 36 (S.C.C.).

496

SUPREME COURT LAW REVIEW

(2008), 40 S.C.L.R. (2d)

large. Ironically, the manner in which a prosecutor must prove indecency
is not much different than the way in which Parliament would be
required to prove the merits of enacting the offence if called upon to do
so in an expanded form of substantive review of the actus reus. To prove
that a bawdy house was kept for indecent purposes, the Crown must
now present evidence akin to legislative facts:
Incompatibility with the proper functioning of society is more
than a test of tolerance. The question is not what individuals or the
community think about the conduct, but whether permitting it engages
a harm that threatens the basic functioning of our society. This ensures
in part that the harm be related to a formally recognized value, at step
one. But beyond this it must be clear beyond a reasonable doubt that
the conduct, not only by its nature but also in degree, rises to the level
of threatening the proper functioning of our society.
Whether it does so must be determined by reference to the values
engaged by the particular kind of harm at stake. If the harm is based on the
threat to autonomy and liberty arising from unwanted confrontation by a
particular kind of sexual conduct, for example, the Crown must establish a
real risk that the way people live will be significantly and adversely
affected by the conduct. The number of people unwillingly exposed to
the conduct and the circumstances in which they are exposed to it are
critical under this head of harm. If the only people involved in or
observing the conduct were willing participants, indecency on the basis of
this harm will not be made out.
If the harm is based on predisposing others to anti-social behaviour,
a real risk that the conduct will have this effect must be proved. Vague
generalizations that the sexual conduct at issue will lead to attitudinal
changes and hence anti-social behaviour will not suffice. The causal
link between images of sexuality and anti-social behaviour cannot be
assumed. Attitudes in themselves are not crimes, however deviant they
may be or disgusting they may appear. What is required is proof
of links, first between the sexual conduct at issue and the formation of
negative attitudes, and second between those attitudes and real risk
of anti-social behaviour.
Similarly, if the harm is based on physical or psychological injury
to participants, it must again be shown that the harm has occurred or
that there is a real risk that this will occur. Witnesses may testify as to
actual harm. Expert witnesses may give evidence on the risks of potential
harm. In considering psychological harm, care must be taken to avoid
substituting disgust for the conduct involved, for proof of harm to the
participants. In the case of vulnerable participants, it may be easier to
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infer psychological harm than in cases where participants operate on
an equal and autonomous basis.
These are matters that can and should be established by evidence,
as a general rule.209

Although the Court applies the “harm principle” on a routine basis,
it may have rejected the characterization of the principle as fundamental
in order to keep open the possibility that criminal law can serve paternalistic
purposes. In the marijuana cases, the Court was clear in stating that “we
do not accept the proposition that there is a general prohibition against
the criminalization of harm to self.”210 The only examples the Court can
point to of paternalistic criminalization are regulatory laws relating to
“seatbelts and motorcycle helmets”,211 and these examples clearly do not
prove that as a society we believe we can imprison people for their own
good. Even though the Court has had occasion to say that “all criminal
law is ‘paternalistic’ to some degree”,212 it is unclear what this means
and from where this principle is derived.
In a constitutional challenge to the anal intercourse prohibition on
the basis of age discrimination, the state claimed it had a compelling
interest in criminalizing anal intercourse under the age of 18 to protect
the participants from a variety of medical harms.213 In dismissing this
claim, Abella J.A. (as she then was) aptly describes why paternalism has
no meaningful role to play in criminal law:
Health risks ought to be dealt with by the health care system . . .
.....
When governments define the ambits of morality, as they do when
they enunciate laws, they are obliged to do so in accordance with
constitutional guarantees, not with unwarranted assumptions. Sending
young people to jail for their own protection when they exercise
sexual choices not exercised by the majority, represents, in my view,
even if benignly intended, precisely such unwarranted assumptions . . .
.....
209
210
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There is no evidence that threatening to send an adolescent to jail will
protect him (or her) from the risks of anal intercourse. I can see no
rational connection between protecting someone from the potential
harm of exercising serial preferences and imprisoning that individual
for exercising them. There is no proportionality between the articulated
health objectives and the draconian criminal means chosen to achieve
them.214

The Supreme Court of Canada’s endorsement of paternalism in
criminal law is the most frightening aspect of the Court’s incoherent
vision of criminal law. It is not simply bad public policy to incarcerate
an individual for his or her own protection, but paternalism can lead to a
political nightmare:
Paternalism at its best entails well-meaning and justified interference
with autonomous choice. But if in practice things do not work out for
the best — if, for example, one’s leaders are incompetent, corrupt,
stupid, or evil — paternalism is the royal road to totalitarianism, since
it invites government to substitute for its citizens’ expressed preferences
that which the state judges they “really” (objectively) want or need. This
is a recipe for tyranny. 215

I do not think that the Supreme Court fully considered the implications
of accepting paternalism as a proper goal of criminal law. The Court’s
endorsement of paternalism just seemed to flow naturally from its
replacement of the impugned goal of “legal moralism” with a “core
values” approach to criminalization. Criminal law may not be used to
dictate personal moral choices but “it is open for Parliament to legislate
‘on the basis of some fundamental conception of morality for the purposes
of safeguarding the values which are integral to a free and democratic
society’” (emphasis in original).216 In the absence of demonstrable harm
to others, the criminal law power can extend to “fundamental social and
ethical considerations” and criminal prohibitions can be enacted to protect
societal core values. Of course, as with the debate over harm, there will
be different understandings of “core values”, but even in a “polycentric”217
moral universe, the notion of “core” should mean that these values will
214
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be few in number. The Supreme Court’s reformulation and narrowing of
legal moralism as core value legislation provides some rational support
for its puzzling endorsement of paternalism. Perhaps the Court was
simply stating that paternalism can be invoked, and the consent of the
participants overridden, if the end goal is the protection and preservation of
core values.
In the end it is difficult to ascertain whether the Supreme Court of
Canada has a clear and coherent vision of the objectives of contemporary
criminal law. In the midst of the confusion, one point emerges with
clarity. Substantive review does not extend to questioning the wrongfulness
of the actus reus. Even when the Court of Appeal of Ontario placed the
harm principle on the short list of principles of fundamental justice, it
was quick to point out that the principle “does not give the judiciary
licence to review the wisdom of legislation”.218 Parliament is the sole
judge of what is wrongful and this cannot be challenged directly by the
judiciary. Parliamentary supremacy is pushed aside to review all the
elements of an offence save and except for the presumed wrongfulness of
the act or omission. This stubborn refusal to extend substantive review
to this last element is based upon the conventional wisdom that reviewing
the merits of law is beyond the competence and legitimacy of the judiciary.
Unfortunately, reliance upon this conventional wisdom in the context of
criminal law leads to the denial of another conventional wisdom relating
to the transformative legal significance of consent and choice.
3. Unifying Principles and the Legal Significance of Consent
As mentioned at the outset, there is no single and simple unifying
theory to explain the operation of criminal law, and one cannot really
expect that the courts will have developed a consistent and coherent
theoretical framework for understanding the minimum content of criminal
law. The harm principle may be attractive to many and pervasive in
modern thought, but the Supreme Court’s movement away from this
simple proposition may reflect the fact that there are so many theoretical
formulations of the concept of harm219 that the Court was concerned
about the future implications of enshrining a principle filled with ambiguity.
218
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It may have been a mistake to advance the harm principle as the
governing principle for substantive review as the shifting sands of political
theory may not present a coherent foundation for judicial intrusions into
the political realm. It may have been more prudent to rely upon a narrower
principle more recognizable in legal discourse. The marijuana possession
offence is just one in a series of offences characteristically classified as
“consensual crime” — crimes designed to “ban through criminal legislation
the exchange between willing partners of strongly desired goods or
services”.220 The common denominator of all consensual crimes is the
unique fact that the participants do not see themselves as victims and
through their consent express a desire to choose harm to themselves
(and presumably not to cause harm to others or society — an issue that
still is hotly debated). In light of the significance of consent in structuring
many, if not most, legal arrangements, the focus of the fundamental
justice inquiry should have revolved around the question of whether
there is a “fundamental social or ethical consideration” to justify a legal
prohibition on eliminating the absence of consent from the definition of
the actus reus of a given crime.
It has been said that consent is a “moral transformative” in that it
“derives its normative power from the fact that it alters the obligations
and permissions that collectively determine the rightness of others’
actions”.221 There is no doubt that the state may successfully argue that
consent can be overridden in a specific context in order to protect “core
values” based upon “fundamental social or ethical considerations”, but
the fact remains that core value limitations on the exercise of consent
should be fairly limited in a pluralistic society. With the exception of
these few limitations on consent, the starting point for analysis should
be the recognition that exercising choice is an inherent good because
“to have the ability to create and dispel rights and duties is what it
means to be an autonomous moral agent”.222 Therefore consent should
Crim. L. Rev. 47; John Kleinig, “Crime and the Concept of Harm” (1978) 15 American Philosophical
Q. 27; Heidi M. Hurd, “What in the World Is Wrong?” (1994) 5 J. Contemp. Legal Issues 157.
220
E. Schur & H. Bedau, Victimless Crimes: Two Sides of a Controversy (Englewood
Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1968), at 6. The Schur and Bedau debate remains the most thorough and
thoughtful analysis of the problem of consensual crimes; however, for a brief introduction to the
literature continuing the debate over criminal law and consensual crimes, see P. McWilliams, Ain’t
Nobody’s Business If You Do: The Absurdity of Consensual Crimes in a Free Society (Los Angeles, CA:
Prelude Press, 1993); R. Meier & G. Geis, Victimless Crime? Prostitution, Drugs, Homosexuality,
Abortion (Los Angeles, CA: Roxbury Publishing, 1997); C. Carr, “Between Virtue and Vice: The
Legal Enforcement of Morals” (2004) 14 Kan. J.L. & Pub. Pol’y 1.
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be presumptively effective to shield an actor from criminal law and the
burden should be on the state to rebut the presumption.
H.L.A. Hart analyzed the common features of ascriptions of liability
in civil and criminal law and concluded that the conditions of liability
are structured to maximize the effectiveness of choice:
It is at this point that I would stress the analogy between mental
conditions that excuse from criminal responsibility and the mental
conditions that are regarded as invalidating civil transactions such as
wills, gifts, contracts, marriages and the like. These institutions provide
individuals with two inestimable advantages in relation to those areas
of conduct they cover. These are (1) the advantage to the individual in
determining by his choice what the future shall be and (2) the
advantage of being able to predict what the future will be. . . . In brief,
the function of these institutions of private law is to render effective
the individual’s preferences in certain areas. . . . If with this in mind
we turn back to criminal law and its excusing conditions, we can regard
their function as a mechanism for similarly maximizing within the
framework of criminal law the efficacy of the individual’s informed
and considered choice in determining the future and also his power to
predict the future.223

The political value of actualizing choice found expression in a legal
principle formulated 1,000 years earlier than the principle actus not facit
reus nisi mens sit rea. Sixth-century Roman law recognized the maxim
volenti non fit injuria (no wrong is done to one who consents). This
principle was incorporated into British law in the 14th century and by
the 17th century it became a maxim of British private law.224 Originally,
the maxim had application in both civil and criminal law, but “changes
in the power of an individual to consent to personal harm came in the
seventeenth century” as a “natural consequence of the monopolization
of the system of punishment by the state”.225 The maxim has never been
seriously challenged but its significance in criminal law has been tempered
by the growth of exceptions to the general rule that consent governs
liability.
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In the realm of criminal procedure the Supreme Court of Canada has
recognized that the “scope of the criminal procedure power under
section 91(27) [of the Constitution Act,1867226] needs to be re-evaluated
in light of the evolution in our constitutional culture since the entrenchment
of the Charter”.227 One critical part of this constitutional culture is the
recognition that the law must facilitate an informed choice by the accused
as to whether procedural rights can be waived in certain circumstances.228
Once consent or waiver is present, the courts will allow this personal
decision to override virtually all the constitutional obligations imposed
upon the state by the Charter. For example, with respect to search and
seizure, “the giving of consent has been treated as a private transaction
between individuals, thus rendering irrelevant such public law issues as
the sufficiency of the peace officer’s grounds for acting and the adherence
to procedural prerequisites to intrusion.”229 In the area of self-incrimination,
the Court has unequivocally stated that “the single most important
organizing principle in criminal law is the right of an accused person not
to be forced into assisting in his or her own prosecution.”230 The Court
has stated that this “case to meet” principle is a “unifying thought” in
criminal procedure, and the “central assumption of this theory is that
criminal suspects should, as a matter of principle, have the freedom to
choose whether to provide self-incriminating evidence to the state”.231
In the fair distribution of rights and obligations in the criminal process,
autonomous choice is a governing and dispositive legal event. Many
legal structures can be explained and understood as reflecting a “protected
choices” theory of rights:
This theory, known as the choice, will or power theory, promotes the
idea “of the right holder having the freedom to choose among a set of
options, and of this freedom being protected by a set of duties imposed
on others”. Modern rights theory sees a right as a complex of Hohfeldian
positions that contains a core element and a protective perimeter of
226
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associated elements. Regardless of whether we are dealing with a
Hohfeldian claim right, power or immunity, the “unifying factor” is
that “the law specifically recognizes the choice of an individual either
negatively by not impeding or obstructing it (liberty and immunity) or
affirmatively by giving legal effort to it (claim and power)”. 232

There is no need to look beyond the substantive criminal law itself
to find support for the proposition that the deep structure of law is
designed to foster autonomous choice. Criminal liability is based upon
the “culpability of choice”233 as manifested by a subjective mens rea.
The endless and divisive debate over the proper role of negligence in the
ascription of criminal liability arises from the fact that negligent acts do
not reflect choice and are based upon a “culpability of inadvertence”.234
On countless occasions, the Supreme Court of Canada has spoken of the
“critical importance of autonomy in the attribution of criminal liability”:
The treatment of criminal offenders as rational, autonomous and choosing
agents is a fundamental, organizing principle of our criminal law. Its
importance is reflected not only in the requirement that an act must
be voluntary, but also in the condition that a wrongful act must be
intentional to ground a conviction. . . . Like voluntariness, the requirement
of a guilty mind is rooted in respect for individual autonomy and free
will and acknowledges the importance of those values to a free and
democratic society. . . . Criminal liability also depends on the capacity
to choose — the ability to reason right from wrong. . . . this assumption
of the rationality and autonomy of human beings forms part of the
essential premises of Canadian criminal law.235

(emphasis added)
Choice is a “fundamental” and “essential” principle with respect to
the mens rea, but for some reason it loses its potency when applied
to the wrongful aspects of the actus reus. Therefore, in the world of
constitutional adjudication, Parliament may be called upon to justify a
232
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departure from the requirement that the offence contain a mens rea
which reflects choosing harm to others, but it will never be required to
justify the creation of a criminal actus reus which eliminates the legal
significance of the consent of all the parties to the transaction. Not only
are the courts ignoring the fundamental role consent plays in structuring
legal arrangements, but they are also ignoring the fact that there may be
a societal consensus recognizing the fundamental primacy of consent:
[I]t is well documented that the public’s view of consensual harm
differs dramatically from the one promoted by law. A famous study of
the American jury has shown that from the jury’s perspective “insofar
as the victim is disqualified from complaining, there is no cause for
intervention by the state and its criminal law”.236

The wide gap between the public’s perspective and the perspective
of lawmakers was clearly demonstrated by the legacy of the Morgentaler237
abortion cases — despite the formal or technical violation of the elements
of the offence, juries consistently nullified the law by acquitting Dr.
Morgentaler.
The reluctance of the courts to embrace the absence of consent as an
essential element of the actus reus seems to be based upon the courts’
fear that the apparent consent to choose harm may in actuality be a coerced
choice. Looming behind the Supreme Court’s refusal to recognize Sue
Rodriguez’ right to assisted suicide was the fear that unscrupulous doctors
and nurses will exploit the vulnerable and coercively persuade people to
commit suicide. Similarly, in the sex club cases, the Supreme Court
acknowledged that
[t]he consent of the participant will generally be significant in considering
whether . . . harm is established. However, consent may be more apparent
than real. Courts must always be on the lookout for the reality of
victimization. . . . In the case of vulnerable participants, it may be
easier to infer psychological harm than in cases where participants
operate on an equal and autonomous basis. 238

It seems a bit disingenuous for courts to allow the consent of the
participants to be overridden by legislative will simply because of a fear
that the courts will not recognize a coerced choice. The determination of
236
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whether choices are real or coerced is part of the courts’ daily business.
Every time a confession is admitted into evidence, the courts have
assessed the validity of consent, and in assault and sexual assault trials,
the courts are often required to undertake an assessment of the reality of
consent. The Supreme Court of Canada may have struggled in its attempt
to illuminate the pre-conditions for a valid consent to sexual activity,
but it has developed a coherent and comprehensive jurisprudence for
distinguishing consent from coercion.239
In a small handful of cases,240 the accused has argued for constitutional
invalidation on the basis that a criminal offence does not require proof
of an absence of consent or “because no defence of consent is available”.241
The courts have summarily dismissed the claim that the “absence of
consent” is a principle of fundamental justice. In dismissing the claim in
the context of challenge to section 155 (incest among adults), the Nova
Scotia Court of Appeal had little to say about the fundamental nature of
consent in structuring legal relationships, but it was quick to point out
that “[o]ne of the difficulties with this argument . . . is that the consent
given in an incestuous relationship may be mere acquiescence.”242
It is not surprising that courts give little weight to the express
preferences and choices of accused persons, in light of the Supreme
Court of Canada’s troubling 1991 decision in Jobidon.243 Perhaps one can
understand why a court would not want to second-guess a legislative
decision to override consent, but in Jobidon, the Court actually read out
the requirement of an “absence of consent” from the legislative definition
of assault in cases where the accused intends and causes bodily harm.
Relying upon a misguided invocation of the notion that “[a]ll criminal
law is ‘paternalistic’ to some degree”, 244 the Court second-guessed
Parliament’s decision that people have the right to engage in consensual
physical fights. The Court recognized that it would be imprudent to read
out the significance of consent in all cases because of the implications
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for “rough sporting activities” and “appropriate surgical interventions”.245
Accordingly, the Court ruled that the “absence of consent” will remain
an essential element of the offence of assault when “the activities have a
positive social value and the intent of the actors is to produce a social
benefit . . .”.246
It is difficult to reconcile the Court’s aversion to reviewing the
merits of law as part of substantive review with its willingness to
reformulate the elements of the actus reus in accordance with its views
on “social value”. More significantly, basing a decision to criminalize
upon considerations of “social value” comes very close to the type of
“legal moralism” the Court condemned as having no role to play in a
modern, pluralistic society. Recognizing the fundamental primacy of
consent, and only allowing this consent to be overridden when the state
has a demonstrable compelling interest, is the most effective way to
ensure that modern criminal law does not slide back to legal moralism.
Overriding consent, especially for activities conducted in private, will
always come perilously close to the impugned criminal law objective of
“maintaining conventional standards of propriety”:247
. . . individual choices that are not congruent with dominant social
perceptions and preferences are routinely denied recognition by the
criminal justice system. When collective preference or interest, and
individual preference or choice are in conflict, the criminal law
doctrines of Anglo-American legal systems are used to deny recognition
and enforcement to individual preference. . . . Individual choices that
do not coincide with the dominant interpretation of social values (and
may also conflict with the interests of one of the more powerful social
groups) can be ignored or disregarded with impunity. . . . Development
in the law of consent to recognize and protect individual preference,
even when that preference conflicts with societal convenience, would
enhance the autonomy, dignity and quality of life of many people,
especially members of disempowered social groups whose choices
most need legal protection.248

The reluctance to recognize the absence of consent as a fundamental
component of a constitutionally valid actus reus is not simply related to
the problem of ascertaining true consent. There is also a concern that
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elevating the absence of consent to a constitutionally required element
will open a Pandora’s box of evil. Extreme examples like consensual
slavery and consensual cannibalism are often raised to counter the
argument that consent is dispositive of liability. In fact, the Supreme
Court of Canada in the marijuana challenges rejected the harm principle
by invoking cannibalism as an example of an offence which is not
predicated on this principle. Extreme examples of consensual harm can
always be found but the exceptions should not govern the rule. In
advocating the recognition of the primacy of consent, I would still have
no difficulty convicting Armin Meiwes, who advertised on a chat room
his interest in hiring someone for slaughter and a cannibalistic feast.249 It
defies belief that the victim would accept this invitation, but apparently,
before the ultimate slaughter Meiwes had cut off and fried a part of the
victim’s body for the two of them to eat together. Despite the apparently
genuine and perverse consent, it would be difficult to successfully argue
that consent ought to operate in these extraordinary circumstances to
shield the cannibal from murder charges.
Extreme examples do not undercut the primacy of consent but they
do demonstrate why the Supreme Court of Canada has endorsed a “core
values” approach to criminalization. There is no need to resort to
paternalism or legal moralism to condemn the actions of Meiwes as the
state can raise core value objections to justify overriding a consent for
mutilation, slaughter, cannibalism and murder:
Meir Dan-Cohen, for example, argues that the reason society should
outlaw slavery, even in the hypothetical case of voluntary “happy
slaves” is because slavery represents a “paradigm of injustice” which
“by its very terms denies people equal worth and thus treats them with
disrespect”. Similarly, R.A. Duff finds voluntary gladiatorial contests
unacceptable because of “dehumanization or degradation perpetrated
by the gladiators on each other, and by the spectators on the gladiators
and on themselves”. I agree with both Duff and Dan-Cohen that
certain degrading behavior may be harmful, even though it does not
violate the victim’s rights. Society may be concerned about human
dignity even in cases in which a prohibitory norm does not originate in
a rights violation, such as experiments involving fresh cadavers as
“crash dummies” or pieces of art made with body parts of dead fetuses.250
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Despite the fact that core value justifications for criminal law will
be few and far between, the Supreme Court’s recognition of this modern
version of legal moralism should encourage courts in the future to
recognize the absence of consent as a fundamental principle of justice.
The fear of the cannibal and other deviants who push the recognizable
boundaries of consent being granted constitutional protection under this
principle is unfounded in the presence of the availability of core value
justifications for prohibiting this conduct. The only question remaining
is whether the courts would ever consider endorsing a principle which
by definition reverses the traditional burden of proof in Charter claims.
Crowning the absence of consent as a fundamental principle is meaningless
without the qualifier “unless the state has a compelling justification for
overriding the participant’s consent”. Therefore, the very formulation of
the principle builds in a requirement that the state justify the intrusion
into autonomous choice. The doctrinal purist will insist that the state
only bears the burden of demonstrating a compelling justification when
it comes to the reasonable limits assessment under section 1 of the
Charter, but as criminal law continues to expand in an unprincipled
manner, there may come a time when the Court recognizes the political
and constitutional benefits that can be reaped by imposing a burden of
justification on the state whenever a criminal offence eliminates absence
of consent from the definition of the actus reus.

IV. CONCLUSION
Beyond the constitutionalization of fault, substantive review of criminal
law has not led to a clearly defined collection of concrete principles
designed to set minimum standards for the ascription of criminal liability.
Some progress has been established with respect to the principles of
fault, but judicial review loses it potency when it approaches actus reus
issues above and beyond the core principle that all acts must be voluntary.
Our judiciary has not embraced the notion advanced by L’HeureuxDubé J., in her dissenting opinion to uphold some forms of constructive
murder, on the basis that “the assessment of moral guilt depends on a
view of the whole circumstances, and not on the distinction between the
presence or absence of a particular mental event such as the foresight
and acceptance of a risk.”251 In her view, an offender’s fault is not
251
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restricted to evaluations of mental states, but includes an analysis of the
degree of fault and blameworthiness which is built into the actus reus
component of a crime. The “denigration of actus reus”252 has led the
courts to abandon any effort to determine whether Parliament has
constructed an actus reus which bears a rational relationship to harmful
conduct deserving of punishment.
Understandably, a foray into evaluating the content of the actus reus
compels the Court to enter the political realm to assess Parliamentary
justifications for depriving people of liberty for the commission of the
stipulated actus reus elements. The Court’s reluctance stems from the
celebration of legislative supremacy, but once the “pathological politics”
of criminal law reform is understood there is little reason to cling to a
political precept which may be responsible for massive overcriminalization
and creating an undue burden on limited justice resources. As Professor
Stuntz has noted:
If criminal law is inescapably political, both in the sense that it rests on
contestable value judgments and in the sense that it embodies tradeoffs between different values, it seems natural to assign responsibility
for it to the most politically accountable actors [i.e., legislatures]. My
response to that argument is not to deny its premise. Rather, I seek to
show that legislator’s political incentives are to criminalize too much
— with “too much” defined by the preferences of the very constituents
whose wishes legislators are supposed to represent. Once one understands
those incentives, one may conclude that courts are more likely than
legislatures to capture social value judgments accurately. 253

The problem with the current approach to substantive review is that
the courts have not constructed any doctrinal tools to combat a legislature
gone bad. Perhaps the Supreme Court had a basis for upholding the
obscenity provisions, the marijuana possession offence and other
consensual crimes of dubious validity, but its outright rejection of the
harm principle, or a related principle relating to the primacy of choice
and consent, is somewhat myopic. There was no reason to throw the
baby out with the bath water. The courts should maintain some control
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of the criminalization process, and they should be developing doctrine
which will allow an assessment of the wrongfulness of the actus reus in
rare cases in which Parliament has succumbed to the unprincipled
influence of a moral panic.
Even if one believes in the reality of electoral accountability as a
real constraint on political action, it is naive to assume that the process
can never short-circuit. I am certain that courts are aware of this possibility,
but they tend to adopt a cavalier “wait and see” attitude, believing that if
a true political short-circuit were to happen, the courts will be able to
fashion some constraint when the time arrives. This cavalier attitude of
“wait and see” crippled the U.S. Supreme Court in terms of its ability to
protect privacy,254 and, to my dismay, we can see our Supreme Court
starting to adopt this approach. In 2005, the Supreme Court of Canada
concluded that there is no constitutional protection in relation to law
enforcement’s use of infra-red technology because the current technology
was fairly non-intrusive. It is beyond dispute that the technology will
clearly be improved and will become more intrusive, yet the Court was
content to lie back and wait:
Whatever evolution occurs in the future will have to be dealt with by
the courts step by step . . . [i]f as expected, the capability of FLIR
[infrared] and other technologies will improve . . . it will be a different
case, and the courts will have to deal with its privacy implications at
that time. . . .255

It is more prudent to set constitutional constraints in advance to nip
a crisis in the bud than to struggle to develop constraints in the face of
the crisis.
Perhaps the Court cannot be faulted for a failure to develop a
coherent theoretical framework for assessing the merits and validity of
the content of criminal law — theory can be divisive and indeterminate
and conventional thinking has always asserted that the merits of law are
beyond judicial review. More disconcerting than the failure to operate
upon a clear theoretical vision of the purpose of criminal law is the
Court’s lack of understanding that “the danger is not that our few prized
liberties will expire in some anguished and bloody battle, but rather by
254
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slow degrees, by slight turnings of the screw, by steady constant erosion,
they will slowly disappear”.256 Parliament may never enact ridiculous
offences, such as the sausage prohibition discussed at the outset of the
paper, but if substantive review cannot serve to place some constraints upon
the criminalization process, there will never be an effective constitutional
obstacle to prevent Parliament from slowly turning the screw of criminal
law to gradually erode liberty in the quest for false security.
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